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LOCAL PROPERTY LAW: ADJUSTING THE SCALE OF
PROPERTY PROTECTION
ChristopherSerkin*
This Article proposes that issues surrounding the protection of private
property should be resolved at the local level, and that local governments
should be allowed to select the property protection that they want to offer.
Specifically, this Article proposes state legislation to create a mechanism for
local precommitments around the most contested takings and land use issues.
The resulting local variation in property regimes would allow consumershomeowners, developers, and any other property owners-to select the property protection they want by choosing where to live and invest. Implicit in
this proposal is the idea that property protection can be viewed as a tool for
attracting investment. Given the opportunity, local governments should of-

fer property protection when the costs of that protection-in the form of increased compensation and decreased flexibility-are less than the benefits
from increased investment.
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INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause proscribes government tak-

ings of private property without just compensation.1 What counts as
property, and as a taking of property, remain vital but unanswered questions, as courts and scholars have been unable to provide a good, single
answer to the takings puzzle. 2 Perhaps, however, the search for a grand

unified theory of takings is misguided. A land use decision by New York
City may look quite different-and implicate different concerns-than a
similar decision by York village. 3 This Article proposes embracing variation in limits on local government regulations. Nonuniform property

protection could provide a previously unidentified source of interlocal
competition, allowing different communities to satisfy different demands
1. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
2. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1624, 1626 (2006) [hereinafter Serkin, Big
Differences] ("The lack of coherence does not necessarily reflect a problem with the
theories themselves, however, but is instead rooted in the unrealistic expectation that they
each apply with equal descriptive and prescriptive force in all situations."); cf. William A.
Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 14-16 (2001) [hereinafter Fischel, Homevoter
Hypothesis] (suggesting takings as a solution to local land use controls, but arguing
generally that local governments' character is different from character of larger
governments); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 Yale LJ. 203, 205 (2004) ("[Federalism] concerns make it
inappropriate for the Court to use the Takings Clause as a vehicle for articulating a
comprehensive theory of the limits on government power to regulate land.").
3. York is approximately forty-five minutes south of Rochester in upstate New York. It
has a population of approximately 3,500, and could not be more different from New York,
New York. See York, New York, at http://www.city-data.com/city/York-New-York.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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by offering competing packages of property rights. 4 Institutionalizing
this competition would allow local governments to decide for themselves
whether and how to ratchet up protection from the Takings Clause's constitutional baseline.
Specifically, this Article proposes state legislation that would give lo-

cal governments a choice of various property regimes-a choice to which
they would then be held as a matter of statutory, instead of constitutional,
law. If a municipality wants to increase protection-in response to Kelo v.
City of New London, 5 for example-then it should have a way to do so that
courts will enforce. On the other hand, if a city wants to retain broader
authority to act without paying compensation, it should be free to do that
too, so long as it is consistent with the constitutional floor.6 The kinds of
options this Article proposes making available to local governments consist of different positions on many of the most contested takings and land
use issues. These include, for example, defining "public use" narrowly or
broadly, 7 deciding how much of a diminution in property value is too
much before compensation is due, 8 and selecting the level of compensation that property owners then receive. 9 In effect, a local government
could choose the property regime it wants to offer, and then the state
legislation would hold it to that choice for a certain amount of time. The
key to this proposal is that precommitments by local governments will
allow homeowners, developers, and investors to choose among the property regimes that best satisfy their needs.10
4. This argument is at least somewhat related to a recent suggestion that individual
property owners be allowed to import ownership forms from other states, in effect creating
enforceable choice of law rules governing property rights. See Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L.J. 72, 102-05 (2005). Bell and
Parchomovsky focus on interstate instead of interlocal competition, however, and
therefore emphasize a different arena for competition over property rights. See id. at
76-78 (describing differences in state law).
5. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
6. That constitutional floor is defined primarily by the Takings Clause. U.S. Const.
amend. V.
7. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489-90 (defining "public use"); see also Gideon Kanner, The
Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff"?, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 335, 336
(2006) (describing Supreme Court's "failing" in Kelo); Donald E. Sanders & Patricia
Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 Real Est. L.J. 157, 164-70 (2005) (describing backlash
in response to Kelo).
8. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 135 (Ct. App.
2006) (applying diminution of value test); Dorman v. Twp. of Clinton, 714 N.W.2d 350,
357-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (same).
9. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 682-704 (2005) [hereinafter Serkin, Meaning
of Value] (identifying different approaches to compensation under fair market value
standard).
10. This proposal bears some relationship to Robert Nelson's suggestion that people
living in existing neighborhoods be given the chance to form a private neighborhood. See
Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827,
833-34 (1999). Underlying Professor Nelson's suggestion is an intuition that competition
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A local solution to the takings problem is particularly appropriate

because of competition between local governments." According to
Charles Tiebout's famous hypothesis, local governments compete for residents who, in effect, vote with their feet by moving to-or investing ina particular municipality.' 2 That is to say, people decide where to live,

and developers decide where to develop, based on the mix of taxes and
services that a local government offers. For individuals and families, the
choice will often turn on the quality of the local schools and the level of

property taxation. 13 Developers can often choose among a package of
incentives offered, or fees demanded, by competing municipalities, depending on the desirability of the development and the costs and benefits
it is expected to create.' 4 Creating different local property regimes allows
for a new dimension in Tiebout-style sorting. Satisfying individual preferences for property regimes will unlock additional property values as peo-

ple pay premiums to receive the property protection that they want.
Beyond its specific proposal, this Article also offers a new way of
thinking about the nature of property protection generally, and the
Takings Clause in particular. Instead of, or in addition to, protecting individual liberties, property rights should be viewed as a mechanism for
attracting investment.15 This is a familiar consideration in the international context where a country's commitment to property rights, often
reflected in bilateral investment treaties, is a powerful tool for attracting

over property rights can drive more efficient property offerings. Id. at 832 (discussing
benefits of privatizing neighborhoods).
11. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 43
(2004) ("[M]ajor cities have declined as first residents and then businesses left for greener
suburban pastures. . . . [A] major culprit is the structure of local government law, which
encourages the development of 'metropolitan areas' with major cities ringed by many
dozens, if not hundreds, of independent municipalities." (footnote omitted)); Jeffrey M.
Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary Zoning: A Suggested
Approach, 12 J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 229, 230 (2003)
("[M]unicipalities frequently compete to lure desirable employers into their jurisdictions.
Further, millions of central city residents have migrated into surrounding suburbs in
pursuit of superior public education and other services." (footnotes omitted)).
12. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. Pol. Econ. 416,
417-20 (1956).
13. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 521 (1991) [hereinafter
Been, Exit] ("Consumer information about the 'best places to live' routinely includes
information about a city's taxes, how much a city spends for education, and other indices
of public service quality." (footnote omitted)).
14. See Anika Singh, Implementing Planned Development: The Case of New Jersey,
30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 151, 153-55 (2005) (discussing various financial and
property-based incentives and disincentives that local governments employ to influence
development).
15. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case
Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76
Cal. L. Rev. 267, 290 (1988) (discussing liberty-based conception of Takings Clause).
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foreign capital.16 This insight also applies domestically, between local
governments, where "foreign" investment includes everything from commercial investors choosing where to build to homeowners choosing
where to live. In arguing for local choice in property protection, this
Article asks what kind of property protection a government should offer,
if given the ability to choose. The answer will depend, at least in part, on

balancing the costs to the government of protecting private property
against the benefits of increased investment. To the extent that the
Takings Clause attempts to provide a constitutional answer to this same
question, its interpretation should include a similar inquiry, and this may
7
prove very different from other, more traditional takings analyses. 1
The importance of interlocal competition to land use regulations is
not entirely new to the takings literature. In a leading article, Professor
Vicki Been identified local competition as an important market constraint on local governments' use of exactions (fees local governments

impose as a condition to permitting a particular development).18
Professor Been argued that, in the face of high exactions, a developer can
always move or threaten to move elsewhere, thus constraining any extortionate use of exactions. She referred to this interlocal pressure as competitive federalism, and it is the same force harnessed by this Article's
proposal.19 Exactions, however, occupy a narrow niche in land use regulations. They apply almost exclusively to developers, and they are often
16. See George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal Implications of the Intellectual
Property Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 305,
316 (1993) (discussing increases in foreign investment as primary goal for industrial
property protection regimes); Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can
Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 Colum. J.L.
& Arts 277, 284 (2004) (discussing difference in foreign investment in countries with
varying property protection systems and highlighting "rising influx of foreign direct
investment" in countries with more protective laws). But see Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais,
The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest
for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 139-43 (2003)
(finding unpersuasive justification of expanded property protections as tool to encourage
foreign investment).
17. The more traditional takings analyses have been divided into concerns of
efficiency and fairness. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 998 (1999). The former involves
creating efficient regulatory incentives for government and efficient investment incentives
for property owners to develop their own property. See id. at 997-99 (offering solution to
competing concerns of creating efficient regulatory incentives for government and
efficient investment incentives for property owners).

Fairness, on the other hand, has

been described as barring "[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 476 (identifying exit, or "the opportunity a
dissatisfied person has to . .. move from the jurisdiction," as important market constraint
on local governments); id. at 478-83 (describing exactions).
19. Id. at 509-11 (describing effect of competitive federalism on local land use
exactions). But see Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on
Land Use Exactions, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 834-38 (1992) [hereinafter Sterk, Competition]
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calculated according to statutory schedules that can be anticipated before
investing too much money and time into a project. 20 Other aspects of a
local government's treatment of land-from the prospect of hostile rezoning in the face of development, to the willingness to grant zoning

variances and enter into development agreements-are far less apparent
ahead of time. Exactions, too, are sometimes imposed on an ad hoc basis, thus requiring developers to invest a lot of money before knowing the
extent of the concessions the local government will demand. 21 This
Article therefore builds on Professor Been's important descriptive claim
that exactions are constrained by a kind of market for regulations, offering a new proposal to make the market for land use regulations function

more efficiently and apply more broadly than to exactions alone.
Already, local governments with a reputation for hostility to developers may see development decline. 2 2 Conversely, those with a reputation
for encouraging development will likely see it increase. There is, in other

words, already natural variation among local governments around land
use regulations. 2 3 The problem with relying on these reputational conse(responding to Professor Been and arguing that local governments do not compete for
some uses).
20. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions
and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 609, 644 (2004) ("[M]any jurisdictions
across California, and presumably elsewhere, have established new but costly procedures
for calculating exactions."); Janice C. Griffith, The Preservation of Community Green
Space: Is Georgia Ready to Combat Sprawl with Smart Growth?, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev.
563, 591-92 (2000) (describing Georgia statute requiring schedules for impact fees).
21. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 481 ("Local governments impose exactions
either according to a nondiscretionary, predetermined schedule, or through case-by-case
negotiations."). In recent years, there has been a move toward less discretionary fee
schedules for exactions and impact fees. See Fenster, supra note 20, at 645 n.176 (citing
sources supporting trend). Nevertheless, the complexity of impact fee and exaction
requirements can make it difficult to predict how they will be imposed in a particular
instance. Cf. Edward J. Sullivan & Isa Lester, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in
Infrastructure Financing, 37 Urb. Law. 53, 53-54 (2005) ("[M]unicipalities across the
country are busy quantifying impacts [of development], and developers continue to be
frustrated by the extent of municipal infrastructure finance demands.. . . [T] here is no
mechanism to assure that ... infrastructure financing demands imposed on developers will
not cost more than the actual total impact of the development.").
22. See, e.g., Purvette A. Bryant, Rules, Image Affect Business Development, Orlando
Sentinel, Dec. 15, 1994, at II ("[W]est Volusia has an image problem it must overcome in
order to strengthen itself economically."); Janet Clayton, Overlapping Communities Add
Up to 4,000 Miles of Red Tape, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1987, § 4, at 9 ("But some leaders now
say the Southland's reputation for crazy-quilt regulation could force out some businesses
and keep others from coming in."); cf. Eric Stirgus, DeKalb Tries New 'Overlay District'
Planning, Atlanta J.-Const., June 10, 2002, at C3 ("Planners caution overlay districts can
become another layer of bureaucracy that discourages developers from coming to an

area.").
23. See Shelia R. Foster, From Harlem to Havana: Sustainable Urban Development,
16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 783, 803-04 (2003) (discussing employment of local groups and
community-based "decision-making structures" in land use and planning to utilize
resources that promote economic and social development). In fact, local governments
and local residents employ all kinds of signaling mechanisms and proxies to attract the

2007]

LOCAL PROPERTY LAW

889

quences is that they are insufficiently sticky to generate the real benefits
of Tiebout-style sorting. A local government has no way of guaranteeing
that its regulatory forbearance in one instance will carry forward in the
future.
Local governments can change. Land use restrictions in place when

someone buys property may not be in place later. Such changes are quite
common and are at the heart of much takings litigation against local governments. Not only can a local government rezone individual property, it

can amend its zoning ordinance to redefine locally permitted uses. 24
Electoral changes or shifts in demographics can also cause subtle or notso-subtle shifts in a local government's attitude toward private property
generally, perhaps leading to greater scrutiny of subdivision applications
or simply a newly obstructionist attitude toward development. 25 Sometimes, plans can even be thwarted by popular referendum changing the
applicable land use regulations.2 6
This Article ultimately does not propose locking in specific land uses
or zoning ordinances, or removing local governments' flexibility in addressing new land use issues. Local flexibility in this arena is undoubtedly
a good thing. Zoning ordinances are often amended because of genuine
changes in the character of a community, technological changes, or shifts
in local priorities. 27 A local government's attitude toward condemnation
may change as it faces new and unexpected economic challenges. Inkinds of uses and neighbors they want and to repel those they do not. Cf. Richard
Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial
Segregation, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1365, 1388 (1997) (describing "social meaning" of
jurisdictional boundaries); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437, 454-55 (2006) (arguing that local governments use
investment in "club goods" that only certain demographics favor in order to discourage
others from entering community).
24. See, e.g., Parkview Homes, Inc. v. City of Rockwood, No. 05-CV-72708-DT, 2006
WL 508647, at *1-*3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2006) (discussing city's change in permitted uses
following issuance of building permit); 1 John J. Delaney et al., Handling the Land Use
Case § 20:1 (3d ed. 2006) ("Another method of downzoning is to amend the text of a
zoning ordinance to change the allowable uses .... ").
25. Cf. Vanderveen v. City of Arroyo Grande, No. B178611, 2006 WL 41149, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2006) (discussing differing approach of "newly constituted city
council" to conservation of agricultural land within city).
26. See Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami County Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 2002-CA-20,
2004 WL 68014, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004) (upholding voters' denial, by
referendum, of rezoning because that denial was based upon rational concerns).
27. See, e.g., C.R. Johnson Co. v. City of Selah, No. CV-04-3104-LRS, 2006 WL 319308,
at *1 n.1 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2006) (discussing moratorium enacted in recognition of
water system problems caused by booster pumps in developments at high elevations);
Vanderveen, 2006 WL 41149, at *1 (discussing amended designation and subsequent
redesignation of property under comprehensive plan amendment); Riya Finnegan, LLC v.
Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 900 A.2d 325, 325-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006)
(discussing amendment to zoning ordinance inconsistent with township's master plan
motivated by residents' desire for "less intensive use" of property); see also Julia D.
Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 Va. L. Rev.
739, 753-69 (2002) (discussing importance of flexibility in land use decisions).
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stead, this Article addresses a higher-level issue: What treatment will
property owners receive in the face of change? How much can property
owners rely on existing property rules and what will their remedies be
when their expectations are not met? 28 These more fundamental ques-

tions of property protection are now treated uniformly under the Takings
Clause, or under equivalent state constitutional provisions. 29 And instead
of preserving flexibility, forced uniformity around these questions inappropriately ties local governments' hands. If a particular local govern-

ment wants to precommit to greater property protection, such a precommitment might be better for everyone. It will give local governments
another bargaining chip in the competition for desirable local uses, and
will give developers, investors, and even individual homeowners the abil-

ity to select from a variety of competing property regimes.
This is not a proposal to be undertaken lightly. Interlocal competi-

tion around property protection could lead to a race to the bottom and a
general abdication of local land use controls if all property owners' interests are aligned in the same direction, preferring the strongest possible

property protection. 30 In fact, they are not. True, many developers and
28. These remedies will sometimes include liability rules, see infra text accompanying
notes 121-158 (describing options with damages as remedy), and sometimes property
rules, see infra text accompanying notes 114-119, 159-163 (describing options with
property-rule protection), to use the terminology pioneered by Calabresi and Melamed.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
29. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) ("The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without
just compensation." (citation omitted)); Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 900-03 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing state constitution); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Muskogee County v.
Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 650-52 (Okla. 2006) (same). Some state statutory provisions may
also be applicable. See Redev. Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234,
238-40 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing statute limiting use of eminent domain); Talley v.
Hous. Auth. of Columbus, 630 S.E.2d 550, 552-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing state
constitutional amendment and subsequent legislation that specifically allows for
acquisition of private property using eminent domain when that property is to be sold to
private party for private use); Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. Lexington County Joint Mun.
Water & Sewer Comm'n, 625 S.E.2d 227, 232-33 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing S.C.
Code Ann. § 28-2-470 (1991), which authorizes landowner to bring separate action
challenging condemner's right to condemn subject property and automatically stays all
proceedings under condemnation until disposition of that action), overruled on other
grounds by Edwards v. SunCom, 631 S.E.2d 529 (S.C. 2006).
30. See generally Ted Janger, The Public Choice of Choice of Law in Software
Transactions: The Dim Prospects for Uniformity, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 187, 190-91 (2000)
(describing generally phenomenon of interjurisdictional competition resulting from
differing laws and regulations designed to attract business and investment that potentially
creates a "race to the bottom" by which problematic externalities are imposed on
competing jurisdictions); Scott R. Saleska & Kristen H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn
Things": An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-theBottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 55, 61-62
(1998) (describing "race to the bottom" in environmental context, whereby relaxation of
local standards leads to decline in locality's social welfare).
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some property owners might well prefer strong protection for their property. A precommitment to offer heightened property protection will, in-

deed, attract developers who otherwise might fear that their investment
in land-a significant immovable asset-will be subject to capricious political pressures.31 Individuals who favor strong property rights will be
similarly drawn to such jurisdictions. But others might well prefer to live
in a place with less property protection. They may willingly exchange
some protection of their own property for a say in what their neighbors
can do on their property, in the form of aesthetic zoning, or maximum
density requirements, to name just two examples. In other words, some
people prefer to live in places with robust zoning and other land use
controls. Others, however, prefer a more libertarian, hands-off approach

when it comes to property. People should be able to choose which they
prefer.
The property regime that will reflect most local governments' best
interests will be the one that maximizes local property values. 32 For

some, it will consist of robust property protection to attract new development. 33 For others, however, it will include retaining strong regulatory
control over local land uses. 34 The best property regime is different depending on the relative costs and benefits of property protection in the
specific local context.3 5 This attention to local variation has largely been

missing from the property rights debate.
Part I of this Article lays out the theoretical foundation for proposing
locally variable property protection. Part I discusses the need for local
variation and introduces the Tiebout Hypothesis. Part II offers up this
Article's specific proposal, describing the important dimensions for any
legislation allowing for local option property protection. Part III examines the costs and benefits of the proposal. Part IV then identifies the
likely preferences of different governments. Part IV also suggests how
31. William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 139 (1995); see also Carol M. Rose,
Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 Yale L.J. 1121, 1126-27 (1996) [hereinafter Rose,
Takings] (reviewing Fischel's book and discussing Fischel's "Federalism Thesis").
32. See, e.g., Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 8-10 (discussing
"special motivation" of homeowners to maximize collective community property values);
Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 24 (1981) ("[U]nless it can alter [its] land area, through
annexation or consolidation, it is the long-range value of [its] land which the city must
secure-and which gives a good approximation of how well it is achieving its interests.").
33. See, e.g., Matt Harrington, Dell Eyeing More Than One Triad Suitor, Bus. J.
Greater Triad Area (Greensboro, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.bizjournals
.com/triad/stories/2004/08/09/storyl.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing incentive packages put together by economic developers to attract Dell to
competing counties in North Carolina).
34. See William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36
Envtl. L. 105, 106, 112-17 (2006) (discussing beneficial effects land use and zoning
regulations have on property values).
35. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court's TakingsJurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 103,
105-06 (2001) (discussing infrastructure costs as impetus for exactions).
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these preferences might help shape our understanding of property protection and the Takings Clause.
I.

THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF PROPERTY LAw

Holding all local governments to the same level of private property
protection makes little sense. 36 Limitations on the government's power
to regulate or even to condemn property will have a very different impact
on rural towns, suburbs, and central cities. While permitting condemnations for economic redevelopment might be necessary for a city like New
London, Connecticut-the site of the Supreme Court's recent controver-

sial property decision 37 -it may seem outrageous in a wealthy, outer-ring
suburb.
This Part first puts a new gloss on two recent takings issues: the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 38 and the threatened

taking by a town of a private golf course in Long Island to convert it into a
public course. 39 In addition to the obvious sources of controversy-well
worn already in the takings literature and popular press 40-both cases
also present particular but previously unidentified systemic challenges for
local governments, challenges that this Article's proposal addresses.
A. Two Examples of Local Takings
1. Kelo v. City of New London. - In its recent and already famous
decision, Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that the
Public Use requirement in the Takings Clause did not prevent New
London from condemning property from individual homeowners to
36. The best justifications turn, in essence, on cost-effectiveness, suggesting a tradeoff
between simplicity and closeness of fit. Here, the costs of simplicity include the forgone
benefits of interlocal competition over property rights, and the benefits of simplicity are
limited at best. Few laud takings law for its simplicity.
37. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also Sheryll D. Cashin,
Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers
to New Regionalism, 88 Geo. L.J. 1985, 2003-04 (2000) (discussing Myron Orfield's
characterization of outer-ring suburbs as communities that yield disproportionate political
influence and enjoy disproportionate infrastructure investments without internalizing a

proportional share of the region's social burdens).
38. 545 U.S. 469.
39. See Vivian S. Toy, A Property Battle Pitting Two Giants, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2006,
§ 14, at 1 (discussing North Hills's efforts to condemn Deepdale Golf Club); see also
Lauren Collins, Long Island Postcard: Libert6, Egalit6, Golf, New Yorker, Apr. 3, 2006, at
27, 31 [hereinafter Collins, Long Island] (describing opposition to North Hills's plan);
Collin Nash, No Deal on a Deepdale Takeover, Newsday, July 6, 2006, at A19 (discussing
Mayor's efforts to stop condemnation).
40. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 7, at 336-38 (describing Supreme Court's "failings"
in Kelo); John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
2006, at Al (describing state movements toward limiting use of eminent domain for
economic development); see also Sanders & Pattison, supra note 7, at 164-70 (describing
backlash in response to Kelo).
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transfer to a developer for the purpose of economic redevelopment."

The case caused a public outcry.42 Many people worried that the Court's
ruling cast all property rights into doubt.43 Anyone's home could be
taken, people feared, if the government said it could be put to more productive use in another's hands.44 Some property rights activists went so
far to make this point that they tried to convince Weare, New Hampshire
to condemn Justice Souter's family home to make an inn-they proposed
to call it the Lost Liberty Hotel-as a form of retaliation for joining the

majority opinion.4 5
To many people, the reaction to Kelo has seemed overwrought.46
The fact is that most local governments do not engage in the kind of

economic redevelopment that New London undertook.4 7 Most local gov41. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90.
42. See, e.g., Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the
Supreme Court: Kelo v. City of New London, 7 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 41, 41 (2006), at http://www
.vjet.org/articles/pdf/sorryforthepdf6.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("[P]roperty rights groups and libertarian think tanks excoriated the majority opinion and
celebrated the dissents. More interesting is the reaction of the rest of the population.
Though with less animus than the organized political right, Americans of most political
persuasions found the majority decision wrong-headed and oppressive.").
43. At least one prominent property rights advocate forecast this sentiment after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo. See Ilya Somin, Robin Hood in Reverse: The
Case Against Economic Development Takings, Policy Analysis (Cato Inst.), Feb. 22, 2005,
at 4, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa535.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing "dangers of the economic development rationale for condemnation" as
a "blank check" for utilization of power of eminent domain on behalf of private interests);
see also Paul Craig Roberts, The Kelo Calamity, Wash. Times, Aug. 7, 2005, at B04 (arguing
that "the Kelo decision threatens all private property" by eliminating distinction between
public and private uses).
44. See, e.g., Susette Kelo, Editorial, Government Has No Right to Take Private
Homes, Buffalo News, July 5, 2006, at A8 ("One year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that my home could be taken by the government and handed over to another private party
for its private use.... There went my property rights, and yours, too."). This slippery slope
argument has infected most of the post-Kelo rhetoric. See David Barron, Eminent Domain
Is Dead! (Long Live Eminent Domain!), Boston Globe, Apr. 16, 2006, at DI ("Spurred by
the warning in Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent that the ruling threatened to trade
in every Motel 6 for a Ritz, press accounts played up the likelihood that cities would soon
seize middle-class homes and small businesses to enhance the local tax base."); cf. Castle
Coal., About Us, at http://www.castlecoalition.com/profile/index.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The Castle Coalition is the Institute for
Justice's nationwide grassroots property rights activism project. [We] teach[ ] home and
small business owners how to protect themselves and stand up to the greedy governments
and developers who seek to use eminent domain to take private property for their own
gain.").
45. See John Tierney, Op-Ed, Supreme Home Makeover, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2006, at
A27 (discussing activists' efforts to condemn Justice Souter's Weare, N.H. home to better
serve public interest as hotel named Lost Liberty Hotel).
46. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About Kelo, Prob. & Prop., Jan.-Feb. 2006,
at 19 (describing misconceptions about judgment).
47. Although there is no precise way to measure the frequency of attempts to
condemn property for economic development, the limited number of cases challenging a
taking for failure to meet the public use requirement is at least telling. Between 1954 and
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ernments would not dream of condemning a Motel 6 and transferring

the property to a more expensive Ritz Carlton. 48 Chances are, property
rights are no less safe after Kelo than they were before Kelo, because the
most important check on government power remains political and not
judicial.49 And politically, only certain kinds of governments, facing certain kinds of economic problems, are likely to engage in the high-stakes
gamble of condemnations for the purpose of economic redevelopment.
Perhaps people's central problem with Kelo, then, is not that it actu-

ally undermines their property rights but that they have no way of knowing whether their own community might use New London-style economic
development tactics. Kelo is seen as a threat to property rights primarily

because local governments have no way of credibly reassuring property
owners that they would not engage in condemn-and-retransfer plans to
put people's property to more valuable use. Some local governments
have attempted to reassure local property owners by promising to forgo
condemnations for economic redevelopment. These are funny kinds of
promises, subject to amendment, or even repeal, if the local government
later changes its mind, which is to say, if a majority of voters in the town

decides that a condemnation for economic redevelopment is a good
idea. 50 Of course, this is precisely the condition that would lead to a
condemnation in the absence of a local ordinance, making the ordinance

a

symbolic

but not particularly

substantive

constraint

on local

politicians. 51
1986, only 308 state and federal cases addressed the question of whether a condemnation
was for a public use. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 61, 95 (1986) [hereinafter Merrill, Public Use]; see also Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle
over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 Real Prop.
Prob. & Tr. J. 251, 257 (2004) (updating Merrill's study for 1986-2003 and finding only
236 additional cases challenging public use of condemnation).
48. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any
farm with a factory.").
49. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 934, 982 (2003) ("Just as political restraint, rather than judicial intervention,
is necessary to limit most regulatory excesses, the political branches rather than the
judiciary must provide the front-line defense against a temptation to overuse the eminentdomain power.").
50. E.g., Town of Seymour, Conn., Ordinance Restricting Eminent Domain (2005),
available at www.seymourct.org/pdf/ordinance%20eminent%20domain.pdf (on file with
the ColumbiaLaw Review); Sara Welch, Milford Lawmakers Vote to Limit Eminent Domain,
WTNH News Channel 8, July 11, 2005, at http://www.wtnh.com/Global/story.asp?S=
3581034&nav=3YeXcOon (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing ordinance
similar to Town of Seymour's in another Connecticut city).
51. This is true whether local governments are in fact majoritarian-as the claim
assumes-or under the control of special interest groups. There is no reason to think that
the conditions that would lead a local government to condemn property for economic
redevelopment-whether majoritarian or minoritarian political pressure-would not also
lead the government to reverse an ordinance preventing such a condemnation.

2007 ]

LOCAL PROPERTY LAW

895

At least this part of the concern over Kelo would disappear if local
governments that do not want the power to condemn and retransfer

could make a more credible commitment that they would not do so,
while those that wanted to retain the power could put current and future
residents on notice. Presumably, if given the choice, some local governments would choose to retain the power to condemn and retransfer property as in Kelo, and some would give it up. To foreshadow the substantive
discussion in Part IV, it is simply not the case that everyone would prefer
to buy into a town that cannot condemn and retransfer property to promote economic redevelopment. 52 Indeed, those local governments with

the greatest power to engage in aggressive economic redevelopment may
fare the best in the Tiebout-style battle for residents and property values.
While living in such a town comes with some risks-risks that yours will be
the property that ends up being taken-it may also come with significant
economic benefits. People, and local governments, should be allowed

the choice.
2. A Private Golf Course in Long Island. - In a story recently percolating through the mainstream and not-so-mainstream press, the wealthy
town of North Hills in Long Island considered condemning Deepdale, an
exclusive and extremely expensive private golf course. 5 3 The town's plan,
ultimately abandoned, was to turn Deepdale into a public golf course.
According to some, the reason for the condemnation was simply that cer-

tain townspeople were unhappy that they could not become members of
the club and wanted to be able to golf there instead of at the half-dozenor-so public courses within a thirty-mile range. 54 In some ways, this is an
easier case of public use than Kelo because the condemned property
would actually have been open to the public. On the other hand, the
town did not claim that the public golf course would have created more
jobs or generated more money for the town than the private golf course,
nor that it would have given rise to any of the other ancillary benefits that
condemnations are usually said to create. 55

52. This point is discussed infra Part IV.B.
53. See Collins, Long Island, supra note 39, at 27 (discussing Village of North Hills's
contemplation of eminent domain to acquire Deepdale golf course); Mike Hughes,
Eminent Domain Move Should Concern Industry, Golf Course News, Mar. 16, 2006, at
http://www.golfcoursenews.com/news/news.asp?ID=2284 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing "slippery slope" concerns raised by municipality's potential ability to
condemn privately owned golf courses for conversion to upscale municipal courses); see
also The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Course Correction (Comedy Central television
broadcast May 2006), at http://www.comedycentral.com/shows/index.jhtml?playVideo=
63619 [hereinafter Daily Show] (describing planned condemnation and satirizing North
Hills's justifications for it).
54. See Daily Show, supra note 53.
55. James Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859,
861-63. In Kelo, New London argued that it was creating substantial ancillary benefits to
the local economy by engaging in aggressive economic redevelopment. Brief of the
Respondents at 8-11, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
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In addition to making an interesting story, this proposed use of eminent domain highlights a concern that condemnations can lead to systemic underinvestment in property. Imagine a golf course builder considering building a new private golf course elsewhere in Long Island.
The project necessarily comes with costs and potential gains. In addition
to the familiar costs, however, the developer will also have to consider the
possibility that the town might seize the golf course and turn it public.
This risk might transform a project from a net winner to a net loser, leading some golf course developers, at least on the margin, not to build.56

But what if this next town really wanted to attract a private golf
course? What if it was actively trying to create the cachet that a private

golf course would bring to the community? The town again has no credible mechanism for reassuring the golf course builder that it will not eventually condemn the golf course and turn it public. 5 7 The only way the
town can induce the developer to build is to give economic concessions
equal in value to the risk of future condemnation. From the town's perspective, this is a particularly bad bargain, especially if it has no intention
of condemning the golf course. It must compensate for harms that it will
never impose, simply because it has no way of guaranteeing that it will not
impose them. A mechanism for making such a guarantee would be far
more efficient for both parties.

Obviously, this problem applies to more than just golf courses. 58 Any
decision to develop or invest in property involves weighing the costs and
benefits of the investment and will include some risk of government action. A local government could stimulate investment by reducing that
risk. While reducing risk can always take the form of economic and other

concessions up front, such concessions are likely to prove more costly to a
local government than precommitting to refrain from actions it has no
intention of undertaking in the future. The local government is then

assuming some risk that its hands will be tied in the event of unforeseen
changes in local conditions, but this is a risk that the local government
can choose to assume or not.59
56. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
509, 512-14 (1986) (discussing effect of compensation on investor incentives).
57. The best current option for some local governments is to enter into a
development agreement. Development agreements, however, are an imperfect solution.
See infra Part I.D.
58. Another recent example involves the attempt by a town in Martha's Vineyard to
condemn a closed movie theater in order to force it to reopen. See Max Hart, Capawock
Stays Closed for Now, Vineyard Gazette (Edgartown, Mass.), Aug. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.mvgazette.com/news/2006/08/11/capawocktheatre.php (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
59. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 88 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
Posner, Economic Analysis]; Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1978) (discussing efficiency of imposing risk on
lowest cost avoider); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6J. Legal Stud. 83, 87-88 (1977).
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B. Property Protection: One Size Does Not Fit All

There is a natural temptation to resolve questions of property protection on the state level. That has, in fact, been the predictable and widespread response to Kelo. Most states have passed or are considering legislation to tighten the public use requirement. 60 Instead of allowing some
local governments to precommit not to take property for economic development, these kinds of state responses would effectively mandate such
precommitment by forbidding categories of condemnations altogether. 6 1

But a statewide response operates at the wrong scale. Certainly, it will
settle property rights in the state, but at tremendous cost. The power to

condemn and retransfer property is far more important to some governments than to others, particularly those whose density means that any

project will require bargaining with many people and that holdout
problems are almost inevitable. 62
Consider New York City's recent development projects that have de-

pended on the power to condemn and retransfer property to a private
developer. In 2002, New York City condemned most of the block on 8th
Avenue, between 41st and 42nd Streets, to transfer to the New York
Times in order to keep the paper's headquarters in the city. 63 The resulting bundled property was incredibly valuable. 64 Although there were

plenty of objections to the project, few people disputed the city's power
to assemble land in this way. 65 Indeed, it is hard to imagine how New
York City could create any large-scale project without the power-or at
60. See Sibley Fleming & Parke Chapman, Eminent Outrage, Nat'l Real Est. Investor,
Feb. 1, 2006, at 20, 21 (describing legislation).
61. See Patricia E. Salkin & Margaret Lavery, Irresponsible Legislating: Reeling in the
Aftermath of Kelo, 34 Real Est. L.J. 375, 385-88 (2005) (describing state legislative
responses prohibiting condemnations for economic development).
62. The common justification for the power of eminent domain is to overcome
holdout problems. Merrill, Public Use, supra note 47, at 75.
63. See Paul Moses, The Paper of Wreckage: The "Times" Bulldozes Its Way to a
Sweetheart Land Deal You Will Pay for, Village Voice (New York, N.Y.),June 25, 2002, at 34
(describing deal); see also Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., LADs and the Art of
Land Assembly 4 (Oct. 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (same).
64. The building was leased by the New York Times for $85.6 million, which amounts
to approximately $63 per square foot. Moses, supra note 63. A plot of land purchased
across the street was worth $180 per square foot. Id.
65. See David W. Dunlap, Blight to Some Is Home to Others: Concern over
Displacement by a New Times Building, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2001, at D1 (discussing
objections to development of New York Times building in Manhattan based on
inappropriate designation of blight and use of precondemnation that decreased values and
discouraged private investment). This is also true of current plans to develop the Brooklyn
Rail Yards. See Nicholas Confessore, Blight, like Beauty, Can Be in the Eye of the
Beholder, N.Y. Times, July 25, 2006, at BI (discussing contention over "blighted"
designation of twenty-two acre site where Forest City Ratner hopes to develop stadium and
high-rise residential buildings); see also Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn, at http://
developdontdestroy.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(opposing use of eminent domain for development around Atlantic Rail Yards in
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least the credible threat-of eminent domain. 66 A statewide redefinition

of "public use" would have a very different impact on New York City than
it would on, say, the small upstate village of York, 6 7 and a statewide redefinition of public use fails to capture these differences.
More generally, any statewide changes in property protection designed to induce investment will miss their target if they fail to account
for differences between local governments. Certainly, the expected value
of a development will increase as the risk of government regulation or
condemnation decreases. But restricting the power of a local govern-

ment to regulate or condemn property comes with its own substantial
costs, costs that vary from government to government.
Take, for example, fees and exactions that local governments sometimes charge developers. 6 8 A state could stimulate development by limiting a local government's power to impose fees or exactions, thus reducing the expected costs of development. In a community with insufficient
infrastructure to handle new development, the marginal cost of development is higher than for communities with excess capacity in their infrastructures. 69 The inability to pass on some of the costs of new development to developers will hurt the former communities more than the
latter. In effect, then, statewide changes in local governments' ability to
regulate or condemn property will have unintended distributional consequences between communities. The costs to at least some communities

may prove much greater than the gains supposedly created by greater
statewide property protection.
C. Tiebout and Competition for Property Protection
This Part has so far focused on the costs created by local governments' inability to precommit to a particular level of property protection.
There are, in addition, specific gains that nonuniform property protection can generate. These arise from the interlocal competition described
famously by Charles Tiebout. 7 0

Brooklyn, N.Y., as an inappropriate, abusive, and unconstitutional use of power to
condemn).
66. See Diane Cardwell, Bloomberg Says Power to Seize Private Land Is Vital to Cities,
N.Y. Times, May 3, 2006, at BI (discussing Mayor Bloomberg's contention that authority to
condemn under New York State's existing eminent domain powers is essential component
of successful development in cities).
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing York).
68. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 478-79 ("Exactions require that developers
provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as a condition for receiving
permission for a land use that the local government could otherwise prohibit.").
69. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 35, at 117 ("The theory behind imposing
exactions is that new development strains public services; exactions are designed to offset
some or all of the burden the new development imposes.").
70. Tiebout, supra note 12, at 422.
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According to the Tiebout Hypothesis, local governments are in direct competition with each other to attract residents. 7 1 The terms of the
competition are the particular mix of services and taxes that the local
government can offer. All else being equal, a town with better schools
will see demand for its property increase, and thus its property values rise.
Conversely, a town that charges higher property taxes will see the opposite. Indeed, empirical studies confirm that property taxes are capitalized
almost fully into property values so that an increase in property taxes re-

sults in a corresponding decrease in property values. 72 Property values
therefore reflect whether and the extent to which the value of local services exceeds their cost in property taxes.
Of course, not all property owners want the same thing. Families
with school age children are likely willing to pay more in property taxes
for better schools than those without. 73 Some older couples without
school age children may prefer their tax dollars to be spent maintaining
roads and on public safety. 74 Preferences for services are diverse, and
people will tend to sort themselves into communities that share their par-

ticular priorities. 75
71. This argument relies not only on Tiebout's seminal article, but also on the work of
subsequent contributors to Tiebout's theory, the most influential of whom include Fischel,
Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 59-60 (arguing that homebuyers are aware of and
able to act on differences in communities); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 Urb. Stud. 205, 208-09 (1975) (suggesting
constraints on Tiebout's Hypothesis to improve accuracy of model); Wallace E. Oates, The
Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical
Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. Pol. Econ. 957, 968 (1969)
(concluding that empirical study of correlation between property values and property taxes
and education expenditures supports Tiebout's Hypothesis); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects
of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: A Reply and Yet Further
Results, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 1004, 1006-08 (1973) (responding to criticism of his study).
72. To be precise, property values decrease by the present value of the annual
increase in property taxes. Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 49-51.
73. E.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to
Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 167, 196 ("[A]dults with
children pay a premium for homes in child-friendly locations with better schools and easy
access to parks or other child-centered recreational opportunities, so that the children's
presence in the household accounts for more than their per capita share of the housing
cost."); Martha Minow, Lecture, Reforming School Reform, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 257, 281
(1999) ("Wealthier, more educated, and more motivated parents already choose to live in
districts with better schools, to pay for private schools, or to press for scholarships or slots
in magnet schools, Metco programs, or a particularly effective teacher's classroom.").
74. Roy Bahl, Local Government Expenditures and Revenues, in Management
Policies in Local Government Finance 77, 77-78 (J. Richard Aronson ed., 4th ed. 1996)
("[T]he government should try to deliver the package of government services and taxes
that the population wants. This 'preferred' package can be affected by a number of
factors. Syracuse requires more snow removal than does St. Petersburg, which requires
more services for elderly residents.").
75. Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 525 n.249 (citing sources). As one leading
commentator describes the Tiebout Hypothesis:
[S]ince persons differ in their preferences for governmental revenue and
expenditure patterns, any potential resident will gravitate to a locality that offers
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This account gets considerably more complex as the interlocal competition becomes more sophisticated.

For local governments, there is a

distinct hierarchy in the uses they want to attract to the town. Most desirable are people, or businesses, that bring a high tax base without burdening public services, like schools and roads.7 6 Among the least desirable
are low-income families with school age children. 77 The former reduce

the costs of public services to everyone else; the latter, the opposite.
Instead of indiscriminate competition for residents, then, local gov-

ernments in fact compete to attract specific kinds of uses and residents.
This competition tends to be fought with land use controls-precisely the
intersection of local governments and substantive property protection. 78
Here, again, there is diversity in the specific approaches local govern-

ments might take depending on their particular priorities. To give just a
few examples, some well-established and well-developed communities
that already offer an attractive mix of services and taxes may want to limit
new growth as much as possible in order to minimize supply and thereby
maintain or increase property values. 79 Think, here, of towns like
Greenwich, Connecticut, or other wealthy New England towns. Their tac-

tics might include aggressive zoning, stringent building codes, fees and
exactions, and procedural hurdles that will increase building costs. 80
Communities with room to grow, like many outer-ring suburbs, may

focus their efforts on developing a residential housing market, seeking to
attract more expensive homes while excluding low-income housing, like
the package providing him with the greatest net benefits. Some persons may
prefer that local revenues be devoted to open space for parks and recreation.
Others might favor additional police and fire protection, and proximity to the
workplace. A third group might prefer expenditures for education or for
government-supported care for children and the elderly. As long as the variety of
local governments is sufficient to accommodate these diverse interests, nurturing
local preferences will generate a more efficient arrangement of local public goods
as persons are able to reside where they can obtain the service packages they
desire and can avoid paying for services they disfavor.
Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1030, 1073-74 (1983) (footnote omitted).
76. As a leading scholar explains:
Local governments may engage in exclusionary zoning or impose impact fees to
keep out newcomers who would cost the communities more in additional public
services than they would provide in new taxes, much as they deploy their tax and
zoning powers to induce new investment that would expand their tax bases.
Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 365, 472 (1999).
77. See Myron Orfield, American Metropolitics 90-91 (2002) (describing wealthy
suburbs' efforts to exclude poor and middle class families in order to maintain property
values).
78. Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 51-52.
79. Id.; see also Sterk, Competition, supra note 19, at 837 (identifying diversity in
local government preferences for new residents).
80. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 390-92 (1977).
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high density, multifamily units. They can do this in a number of ways.
They may charge per-unit exactions and other fees to developers who will
therefore have an incentive to build fewer, more expensive units.8 1 They
may also use zoning and other forms of growth controls-like minimum
lot sizes, density restrictions, or minimum floor space requirements-to
keep the price of new developments up and thereby keep low-income
families out of town. 82
Larger local governments face more complex tradeoffs still. In addition to the tactics described above, they may also compete to attract businesses that will increase their tax base. Here, they will offer various incentives, like tax concessions and promises to rezone. Sometimes they will
even offer to condemn property to overcome potential holdout problems
for larger projects.
Literature around the Tiebout Hypothesis-and there is a lot-has
focused primarily on its effect on local government decisionmaking. 88
Indeed, Tiebout's goal in his original article was to explain how local governments could provide efficient levels of public goods.8 4 It is important,
however, to step back to examine this same interlocal competition from
the perspective of potential residents, developers, or other investors and
to ask what the choice between local governments looks like for them. 8 5
Start with developers, because their interests are easiest to discern.
For developers-whether residential or commercial-the choice of local
government is an important one. When developers purchase undeveloped property, they lock themselves into a significant and immovable asset. 86 One of the key components of the value of that asset is the regulatory environment in which it is located. 87 For land, this means primarily
the zoning ordinance that applies to the property, as well as the nature of
the permitting process and other regulatory requirements that may have
to be satisfied before development can begin. The problem for develop81. Cf. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1211 (N.J. 1977)
(striking down exactions as exclusionary).
82. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 459,
487-88 (2005) (book review) (identifying minimum lot size as an exclusionary technique).
83. See, e.g., Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 478 (describing purpose of article as
"analyzing whether competition in the market for development is sufficient to constrain
local governments"); Rose, Takings, supra note 31, at 1131-35 (arguing that exit
constrains local governments).
84. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 507 (identifying source of Tiebout Hypothesis as
"response to the claim of Paul Samuelson and Richard Musgrave that there is no
mechanism by which local governments can accurately ascertain the amount of public
goods that they should supply to satisfy the preferences of consumer-voters" (footnote
omitted)).
85. Bell and Parchomovsky attempt to harness the same phenomenon, arguing that
Tiebout-style sorting would create a race to the top for statewide property regimes. See
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 96-98.
86. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
87. See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 56 (finding that zoning is
capitalized into property values).
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ers is that the regulatory environment may change-or may not change
in the way that they expected when they purchased the property-in

which case they are stuck with less developable, or even undevelopable,
property.
Consider two typical examples. In one, a developer buys land for a
new residential development. The developer faces a risk that the town
might act to stop, or at least scale back, the planned development. As a
first pass, the town might deny the developer's application for a subdivision permit.88 It might also try to extract significant financial concessions

from the developer, increasing the costs of the development. 89 It might
even try to change the zoning ordinance. 90 Some or all of these actions
might ultimately be unconstitutional takings of the developer's property,
but even the prospect of having to litigate complex constitutional claims,
with at best uncertain outcomes, could dissuade the developer from
building in the first place. Or, consider a commercial developer who
buys property with the promise from the local government that it will
change the applicable zoning ordinance to permit some light industrial
use, and will also provide additional concessions. Here, the developer
faces the risk that the government may have second thoughts and refuse

to change its zoning ordinance, or will otherwise engage in regulatory
obstruction like denying permits and seeking additional concessions.

9

1

In the Tiebout world of interlocal competition, how would a local
government that actually wants these uses go about attracting them? The

problem now is that a local government has no good way of guaranteeing
that it will not engage in this kind of obstructionist conduct. 9 2 But if a
local government had a mechanism for precommitting to certain heightened property protection, this might serve as a valuable bargaining chip
in the competition for development. A developer might be willing to pay
a premium to buy land in a municipality that has precommitted to remov88. See Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 319 (Ct. App. 2006)
(discussing county's permit denial to subdivide six-acre property into two three-acre lots);
Wensman Realty, Inc. v. City of Eaggn, No. A05-1074, 2006 WL 1390278, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 23, 2006) (discussing city's denial of permit to developer for alteration of golf
course).
89. See B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Utah 2006)
(discussing exactions, and subsequent increase in exactions, imposed by county as
condition for building permit); see also Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 481 n.44 (noting
cases in which financial exactions have been imposed upon developers).
90. See Dorman v. Twp. of Clinton, 714 N.W.2d 350, 355 (Mich. 2006) (considering
landowner's action for inverse condemnation following township's rezoning of property
subsequent to landowner's purchase).
91. Cf. Johnson Oil Co. v. Area Plan Comm'n of Evansville & Vanderburgh County,
715 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing inverse condemnation claim
involving claim that permit had been promised and then later denied).
92. The tools available to local governments are ex ante development agreements, see
infra Part I.D, and application of the vested rights doctrine once the use is in place, see
infra Part II.B.7. Neither is a substitute for a more comprehensive method of local
precommitment for the reasons identified in those discussions.
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ing certain regulatory risks. Such a precommitment mechanism, then,
could be an important inducement to development and result in increased property values.

This precommitment approach is not just prodevelopment, however.
Recall that both local governments' and prospective property owners' interests are quite diverse. To take another example, consider the risks facing a well-to-do retired couple choosing where to live. They might buy

into a town with a stable tax base and few schoolchildren, only to find
that some developer of lower-income multifamily housing buys into the

town right afterwards, potentially raising everyone else's property taxes as
the burden on public services dramatically increases. A town that wanted
to attract the couple in this example would not relinquish its power to

engage in aggressive zoning and other land use controls that have the
effect of making property more expensive to develop.
It is easy to extrapolate from these examples and see how diverse the
interests of property owners might be. Some homebuyers might value
environmental protection or scenic beauty, and prefer a town that has

retained broad authority to regulate for these purposes. Some developers might fear eminent domain; others might value eminent domain as a
tool the government might use on their behalf in the future. Some commercial developers might want the fewest regulatory hurdles possible;
others might decide that the success of their project depends on the longterm success and desirability of the community, and so prefer a place that
has retained broad zoning and other regulatory powers.
Different levels of property protection could add an important dimension to Tiebout-style sorting. It would allow potential residents and
other investors to include the government's approach to property protection as another service to consider when weighing a local government's
offerings.
D. Development Agreements
In some states, interlocal competition for specific developments already takes the form of governments offering different levels of property
protection. Development agreements available in California and Hawaii,
in particular, function as a kind of enforceable precommitment by the

local government not to change applicable land use regulations in exchange for some specific concession from the developer. 9 3 These development agreements, authorized by state statutes, operate similarly to this
Article's proposal, but with some important differences. They tie local
governments' hands both more and less than the proposal here, and

both in undesirable ways. Nevertheless, the existence of development
93. The most comprehensive academic article on development agreements is David L.
Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the
Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities after Nollan and Dolan,
51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 663 (2001).
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agreements demonstrates that demand for enforceable property precom-

mitments does exist and that developers will offer a considerable amount
of money in exchange for guaranteed land use controls.
A development agreement imposes a greater limit on government
power because, so long as it is enforceable, it will prevent the government
from making any changes to the applicable land use regulations. Even
where a local government enacts an entirely new zoning ordinance,
courts have held that it cannot apply to land subject to a development
agreement. 94 Using this Article's proposal, a local government may retain greater flexibility than with a development agreement.

Development agreements also may offer local governments too
much latitude because they apply only to one specific property instead of
to all local property uniformly. This is an open invitation for a giveaway
to a developer or other special interest. Especially in larger local governments, the per taxpayer cost of a development agreement may be relatively insignificant, even if it represents a very bad deal for the public. 95
The conditions are therefore ripe for the kind of special interest group
pressure described by public choice theorists. 96 Moreover, development
agreements may not be particularly visible to most voters, taxpayers, and
potential investors, making any Tiebout-style sorting based on the content of development agreements difficult at best.
In contrast, and for the reasons foreshadowed here but discussed
more fully below, the local option property protection this Article proposes would apply uniformly within the locality. This will allow an investor not only to rely on the treatment he or she has been promised, but

also to rely on the same property protection applying to future investors,
too. A generally applicable local property regime also dramatically increases the stakes of a local government's decision about what level of
protection to offer and therefore decreases the risk that the decision will
not reflect the best interests of a majority of local voters and taxpayersalthough admittedly it would also increase the costs of successful interest

group capture.
The emergence of development agreements is therefore important

because it demonstrates that developers will compete for favorable regulatory treatment.

Development agreements do not, however, go far

94. Id. at 688-89 (citing cases, including Cummings v. City of Waterloo, 683 N.E.2d
1222, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), which found that these agreements are valid and
enforceable).
95. Neil Komesar has argued that it is the per capita stakes of any particular decision
that are relevant for assessing applicable political pressures. See Neil K. Komesar, Law's
Limits 61 (2001).
96. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 373-77 (2000) (describing
public choice theory literature in context of Takings Clause); Serkin, Meaning of Value,
supra note 9, at 726-28 (same). See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 875-83 (1987) (describing public
choice theory).
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enough to institutionalize property rights as a dimension for interlocal
competition. For that, something more comprehensive and more visible

is needed.
With this theoretical background in place, it is now possible to dis-

cern the form that local competition over property regimes might take.
The following Part describes this Article's specific proposal to allow local

governments
protection.

to precommit to specific

forms of private

property

II. THE PROPOSAL: LOCAL OPTION PROPERTY PROTECTION

In the face of vastly different needs, different local governments
should have the opportunity to select from different levels of property
protection across a number of dimensions. This Part lays out in detail
what form these choices should take and offers a mechanism for enforcing them. Present and future property owners, developers, and other investors will then have the opportunity to choose between competing
property regimes, just as they choose between local governments based
on other criteria.
A. The Proposal and Constitutional Constraints
Because local governments are essentially creatures of the state, local
governments on their own are unable to create an enforceable precommitment to a particular level of property protection. 97 What is needed,

then, is state legislation creating a range of property options from which
local governments can choose. For purposes of clarity, this Article will
refer to the state enabling legislation as Local Option Property Protection
(LOPP) legislation, and will refer to the individual choice selected by a
local government under LOPP legislation as the Locally Applicable Property Protection (LAPP).
LOPP legislation must contain two key features, although the specific details may vary state-by-state. First, LOPP legislation must set out
the range of options available to local governments, allowing them to

pick and choose among a slate of various property protections. 98 The
section immediately following this one describes those alternatives in considerable detail. Second, LOPP legislation must also specify the decision
rules governing how a local government's choice is to be adopted and
how it can be modified or repealed. Here, too, there is a range of options available to specific local governments, from a one-time choice that
97. Even home rule jurisdictions require state enabling legislation to create
enforceable precommitments because the rules against legislative entrenchment will
prevent a jurisdiction from unilaterally tying its own hands in the future. See infra text
accompanying notes 103-105.
98. Ideally, this will include a broader range of options than current state statutes
regulating land uses necessarily permit, although constitutional constraints still necessarily
apply. See infra text accompanying note 99 (describing existence of constitutional floor).
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serves as a permanent precommitment, to a sunset provision defining the
lifespan of the resulting LAPP (which this Article ultimately endorses,

with some additional modifications). These alternatives are described in
Part II.C, below. In short, state LOPP legislation should define the array

of choices available to individual local governments and then bind those
local governments as a matter of state law.
Before turning to the details of the proposal, however, two constitutional concerns have to be addressed: (1) the Takings Clause and (2) the
problem of legislative entrenchment, which prohibits a legislature from
binding future legislatures. They are considered here in order.
In its purest if highly theoretical form, LOPP legislation would permit local governments to diverge from the constitutional limits of the
Takings Clause in both directions, allowing governments to offer either

higher or lower levels of protection for private property than are currently guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

This would increase the

range of options available and permit local governments to satisfy a
greater range of preferences. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, however, the Takings Clause must continue to provide the baseline property
protection available to all property owners. Local governments, necessarily, will not be able to select less protection than the Fifth Amendment
already provides.
This should give considerable comfort to people inclined to object
that this Article's focus on creating more efficient local property regimes
misses the important countermajoritarian protection of the Takings

Clause. Fairness remains a critical animating principle of property protection in many judicial formulations. 99 A local government's LAPP will
not, indeed cannot, undermine this critical protection from overreaching
government power. Against this constitutional backstop, then, LOPP legislation will only allow local governments to ratchet up property protec-

tion in specific ways.
Certain LOPP provisions, however, are aimed at increasing the pro-

tection for neighbors of regulated property, thus decreasing protection
for the regulated property.1 0 0 These LOPP provisions, then, shift the bal-

99. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."). This principle has been cited by the Supreme Court most recently in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). This formulation, often repeated by the
Supreme Court, is a straightforward articulation of the fairness rationale. See, e.g., TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002)
(quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring));
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
100. This distinction between the rights of a regulated landowner and the rights of his
or her neighbors is used persuasively throughout a leading land use casebook. See Robert
C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials passim (3d ed. 2005).
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ance of property rights toward the neighbors, but across specific noncon10 1
stitutional dimensions that do not run afoul of the Takings Clause.
The second constitutional concern involves the principle of en-

trenchment, which prohibits a legislature from tying the hands of a future legislature. 10 2 Doctrinally, this turns out to be something of a red
herring, although it presents some lingering normative questions taken
up generally in Part III.
It is well settled that the doctrine of entrenchment prohibits a legislature from making ordinary legislation unrepealable. 103 Whatever the
source of the limitation-whether constitutional or rooted in democratic
theory more generally 104 -a legislature today is said to lack the power to
bind future legislatures tomorrow. Indeed, this entrenchment problem is
the very reason that LOPP legislation is necessary; a local government
cannot unilaterally precommit itself to future actions (or inactions).
State legislation, however, removes the doctrinal entrenchment concerns entirely. Instead of a local government tying itself to the mast, the
state LOPP legislation is doing the tying, although allowing local governments to decide for themselves just how tight the ropes should be. This
presents no more of an entrenchment problem than when Congress permits agencies to bind themselves to future conduct, or constrains state
legislation through the Supremacy Clause. 105 At least as a matter of con101. These include increasing the standards for granting a variance or a special
exception and requiring greater consistency between a zoning ordinance and a
municipality's comprehensive plan. For discussion of these LAPP provisions, see infra
Parts II.B.10-11.
102. There is a large amount of literature on entrenchment. Leading articles include
Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379 (exploring rationale behind entrenchment
prohibition and proposing new way to assess "retroactive legislative efforts"); Michael J.
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 502
(1997) (taking "systemic look at entrenchment problems in constitutional law" and
arguing "development of a self-contained, and majoritarian, anti-entrenchment theory of
judicial review" is needed to address entrenchment problem); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665 (2002) (arguing
against rule barring legislative entrenchment); John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91
Cal. L. Rev. 1773 (2003) (arguing for rule barring legislative entrenchment). The LOPP
proposal implicates a form of intertemporal entrenchment, to be distinguished from other
forms that arise from agency problems. See Klarman, supra, at 498-99 (describing
different kinds of entrenchment problems).
103. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (describing
entrenchment doctrine as "centuries-old concept"). The source of the doctrine, however,
remains up for grabs. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 102, at 1665-66 ("The goal of
the academic literature has been to supply the definitive rationale for the rule [of
entrenchment], although the theorists' favorite rationales are all different.").
104. Some people locate the prohibition on entrenchment squarely, if impliedly, in
the constitutional text, while others find it necessary under democratic theory more
generally. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 102, at 1673-93 (comparing theories of
entrenchment).

105. Id. at 1702.
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stitutional doctrine and democratic theory, there is no prohibition on

state LOPP legislation binding future local governments.
Having situated the general LOPP proposal so as to be consistent
with both takings law and the doctrine of entrenchment, the next step is
to detail the range of choices available to local governments in adopting a
specific LAPP.
B. The Array of Specific Choices
In theory, there is no limit to the range of choices local governments

should be given when choosing which LAPP to adopt. The broader the
array of choices, the more diversity there will be among local governments, giving potential investors a broader array of options. In its purest
form, the Tiebout Hypothesis requires as many choices as there are potential residents. 106 Nevertheless, there are certain natural limits to the
kinds of options LOPP legislation will allow, including the information

costs facing potential investors if LAPPs are too different from each
other. 10 7 Most importantly, each choice available to a local government
must be a genuine choice. That is to say, there must be some diversity of
approach that local governments could reasonably take to achieve various
ends. It would make little sense, for example, to include an option
preventing regulations for public safety because such regulations are at

the heart of any government's responsibilities. 111 8
Similarly, LOPP options are only appropriate where there is some
reasonable protection that a local government might choose to offer that
exceeds the existing constitutional baseline. Where current law already
sets a high bar for property protection, there is little or no need for added protection under LOPP legislation. For example, there is little use
for a LAPP constraining denials of special exceptions. Special exceptions
are uses presumptively permitted under a zoning ordinance, but only after seeking a permit.1 09 Courts already tend to prevent attempts by local
governments-or neighbors-to
stop the issuance of special
exceptions.1 10
106. See Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal
Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1389, 1393
(2004) (describing Tiebout as assuming infinite jurisdictions).
107. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 105-08 (discussing effect of
information costs on selection of property regime).
108. In fact, case law suggests that local governments cannot bargain away their
responsibilities under the police power. See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 957, 966 (1987) (discussing
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879)).
109. See Delaney et al., supra note 24, § 30:1 (defining special uses); Roderick M.
Bryden, Zoning: Rigid, Flexible, or Fluid?, 44J. Urb. L. 287, 289-90 (1966) (describing
special exceptions).
110. See Delaney et al., supra 24, § 30:4 (citing cases and describing entitlement to
special use permits).
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In addition, LAPP alternatives must have some valence for property
owners. The more esoteric the LAPP provisions are, the less likely they

are to have an actual impact on property owners' decisionmaking. While
some of the LAPP alternatives described below may still seem opaque to
some property owners, they track important and relatively visible choices
in land use regulation. For example, any property owner can understand
the effect of increased compensation in the event compensation is
due.'" On the other hand, excluded from LOPP provisions for lack of
12
Although
transparency is the vexing problem of conceptual severance.'
theoretically appropriate for varied local solutions, it is hard to imagine
property owners choosing where to buy based on how a local government

treats the problem of conceptual severance. 1

3

What follows, then, is a discussion of those critical components of
property protection that meet all three of these criteria: There is a range
of reasonable approaches to each issue; the current legal baseline is sufficiently low that some local governments might prefer to offer greater protection; and the choices are likely to be apparent and important to property owners.
1. Public Use. - The first LAPP option allows local governments to
designate what purposes will justify the exercise of eminent domain. As
1 4
Local
Kelo held, the constitutional floor here is almost nonexistent.
governments wanting the broadest authority to condemn property will
adopt the constitutional baseline, in which case their discretion will be
largely unfettered. Building up from there, however, the range of options increases dramatically.
There are a number of places to look for the kinds of likely restrictions a government might adopt. Some state courts, like the Michigan
Supreme Court, have developed their own public use tests that are more
restrictive than the test announced in Kelo. 1 5 Michigan, for example,
permits condemnations only for "public necessity of the extreme sort";
when the ultimate transferee remains accountable to the public (as in a

regulated industry); or when the selection of the land is itself based on a
111. See infra text accompanying notes 121-127 (discussing compensation).
112. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676-78 (1988) (discussing
conceptual severance).
113. Some people may object that none of the LAPP options are likely to be relevant
to property owners. Their impact, some might argue, will be overshadowed by the more
pressing concerns of school quality and property taxes. Capitalization studies, however,
demonstrate how fine-grained people's preferences are, suggesting they involve
information heuristics to locate their preferences, and therefore do not need to
understand fully the issues at stake in each LAPP provision. See Fischel, Homevoter
Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 61 (describing information heuristics).
114. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) ("The disposition of this
case therefore turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a 'public
purpose.' Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.").
115. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783 (Mich. 2004).
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public concern (as in blight removal)." 6 Others simply reject condemnations for economic redevelopment.' '7 Blight, too, remains a controversial justification for public use.118
Given the choice, other local governments might prefer to adopt a
LAPP that focuses on the presence of market failures necessitating con-

demnation. These could limit the power of eminent domain to situations
where a bilateral monopoly or holdouts are particularly likely.' 1 9
The most protective LAPP a local government could adopt would
prevent condemnations altogether. Effectively renouncing the power of
eminent domain, a local government could precommit itself to going to
the market for any land acquisition. All of these present viable options
for LAPP protection. As with each of the provisions that follow, the pros

and cons of these LAPP choices are discussed more fully below.120
2. Compensation. - The constitutional baseline for compensation is
the fair market value of the property taken. 2 1 This excludes, however,
whole categories of damages that property owners likely suffer when their
116. Id. (permitting condemn-and-retransfer plans only "(1) where 'public necessity
of the extreme sort' requires collective action; (2) where the property remains subject to
public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected
because of 'facts of independent public significance,' rather than the interests of the
private entity").
117. See City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006) ("We hold
that although economic factors may be considered in determining whether private
property may be appropriated, the fact that the appropriation would provide an economic
benefit to the government and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use
requirement of ... the Ohio Constitution.").
118. See 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain (CBS television broadcast Sept. 28, 2003)
(transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing owner's frustration with
town's construction of term "blighted," which rendered homes in century-old community
"blighted" if they did not have the "[t]hree bedrooms, two baths, an attached two-car
garage and central air" determined to be standard for area structures); Castle Coal., Blight
Makes Right: Unjustified Blight Determinations Pave the Way for Condemnation, at http:/
/castlecoalition.org/publications/report/reportsidebars/13.html
(last visited Feb. 2,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that local governments, having
chosen to seize private property for benefit of private developers, designate areas as
blighted to justify taking of property and maintaining that "blight designation places all
properties in the area at the mercy of both bureaucrats and developers" and should be
seen as first move in "land-grab"); Castle Coal., Is This Property Blighted? You Be the
Judge, at http://castlecoalition.org/castlewatch/bogusblight/index.html (last visited Feb.
2, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing photographs of properties
receiving questionable "blighted" designations).
119. One of the most sophisticated examples of this approach has been proposed by
Lee Anne Fennell in Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 992-1002.
120. See infra Part IV.
121. E.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984); Ala. Power Co. v.
FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002); Palm Beach Isle Assocs. v. United States, 231
F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This rule is subject to two narrow and seldom applied
exceptions. Fair market value does not apply where it would be too difficult to measure or
where manifest injustice would result. E.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467
U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123
(1950)).
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property is taken, most notably subjective and consequential damages. 122
Local governments should be able to adopt a LAPP that increases compensation from the fair market value.
LAPP options, then, could include compensation for some of the
specific damages currently excluded from just compensation. Consequential damages, like moving expenses and, for businesses, the loss of
goodwill, could be awarded, following the lead of the federal Relocation
Assistance Act. 123 A LAPP could also add a percentage kicker to the
property's fair market value, giving, for example, fair market value plus
25%.124
At the high end of the compensation spectrum, a LAPP could award
what amounts to restitution, paying the owner of the condemned property the value the property has for the government. This would allow property owners a share of the gains created by the condemnation. 125 So, for
example, where a government creates value by bundling separate properties through condemnation, the property owners could receive a portion
of the assembled value, and not just the value of their property standing
alone. 126 In many cases, this might eliminate the government's incentive
to condemn property in the first place. Nevertheless, it would test the
government's claim that the condemnation creates some additional community benefit aside from the specific project for which the property is
being taken. 127
Between fair market value and a gain-based award, there is a broad
range of approaches to compensation that a local government could se-

lect in its LAPP.
3. Diminution of Value. -

Under the current Penn Central regulatory

takings test, a government must only compensate a property owner when
a regulation goes too far. 128 Most courts have interpreted this to mean a

regulation that reduces the value of property by some percentage, often
122. See Serkin, Meaning of Value, supra note 9, at 678-79.
123. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain,
105 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 121-23 (2006) (describing Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000)).
124. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2114-15 (1997) (describing payments of 50% premium over fair
market value for government takings in cases construing Mill Act, 1868 N.H. Laws 152, ch.

20).
125. See Serkin, Meaning of Value, supra note 9, at 687-89 (describing compensation
based on harm versus gain).
126. Id.; see also Krier & Serkin, supra note 55, at 870-73 (proposing giving property
owners part of property's bundled value).
127. This is an idea explored in greater depth in Krier & Serkin, supra note 55, at 872.
128. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (stating
that to determine "whether a particular governmental action has effectuated a taking, this
Court focuses .. . both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole").
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in the neighborhood of 85%.129 A diminution in value less than this percentage generally does not require compensation under the Takings
Clause.1 30 A LAPP could change the percentage value that triggers the
compensation requirement. A local government could, for example,

precommit in its LAPP to compensating property owners whose property
values are reduced by 50%, or even by 25%. At the most protective end
of the spectrum, a LAPP could commit a local government to pay for any
reduction in value due to a government regulation. This extreme position was in fact recently adopted in Oregon by popular referendum.'31
While this new law has come under considerable and justifiable criticism
as a statewide approach to regulatory takings,13 2 it might make perfect
sense for some local governments to adopt in order to make themselves
attractive to a particular kind of investment.

Expressed as a percentage, a LAPP could require compensation for
any decrease in property value, at one extreme, and only for decreases in

property value in excess of 85%, at the other.
4. Denominator. - Closely related to defining the relevant diminution of value that triggers compensation, defining the relevant denomina-

tor to use in identifying the extent of any diminution of value has proven
particularly difficult.1 33 The larger the denominator, the more the property must decrease in value before triggering a compensation requirement. If someone owns ten lots, for example, and a government regula-

tion renders one of them valueless, that regulation could be seen as
taking anything from 100% to 10% of the property's value, depending on
whether the denominator is limited to the burdened lot or includes all of

the property owner's property. Because the content of the constitutional
129. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court
cases suggesting that diminutions "approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate
the existence of a taking"); see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va.
L. Rev. 741, 744-45, 782-84 (1999) (discussing diminution of value test).
130. Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 271.
131. See Measure 37, Gen. Election, Nov. 2, 2004 (Or.), available at http://www.sos
.state.or.us/elections/irr/2004/036text.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.352 (2006)). Oregon's Measure 37 has already been the
subject of much discussion. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308,
311-12 (Or. 2006) (upholding constitutionality of Measure 37); Sara C. Galvan, Gone Too
Far: Oregon's Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-Regulating Land Use, 23 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 587, 587-88 (2005). In 2006, California, Idaho, and Washington State all rejected
similar proposals. Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits on Eminent Domain, N.Y. Times, Nov.
15, 2006, at Cl.
132. See Keith Aoki, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: Hurdles to Putting
the Fragmented Metropolis Back Together Again? Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland
Metro and Oregon's Measure 37, 21 J.L. & Pol. 397, 439-40 (2005) (noting critics'
arguments that Measure 37 "portends doom for comprehensive land use planning in
Oregon"); Galvan, supra note 131, at 599 ("Critics charge that Measure 37 threatens not
only to undermine all of Oregon's land use protections, but also to bankrupt local
governments in the process.").
133. See LiorJacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude,
104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1862 & n.98 (2006) (discussing denominator problem).
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test remains murky, at best, any LAPP legislation runs the risk of violating
the constitutional baseline. 134 Nevertheless, a local government could
still commit to a particular position on the denominator problem.
The least protective LAPP provision would include all of the prop-

erty owner's property, wherever situated, in assessing the impact of some
government action or regulation. The more narrowly the denominator is
drawn, the more protective the LAPP becomes, from including only all
local property, to including only all contiguous property, to, finally, in-

cluding only the specific lot being burdened.
5. Temporary Takings. - Ever since FirstEnglish,15 property owners
can theoretically recover for "temporary" takings, where a property owner
is denied the use of his or her property for a limited time.1 3 6 Compensation is generally valued by the fair rental value of the property during the
period of the taking. 13 7
The Supreme Court, however, has resisted creating a new bright-line
rule imposing liability for temporary takings, relying instead on the ad
hoc balancing test in Penn Central to determine whether a temporary taking has occurred. 138 There is unlikely to be liability for normal delays in
obtaining building permits or applying for zoning variances. 139 The
Takings Clause does not necessarily require compensation even for building moratoria, so long as they are temporary in nature.14 0

Governmental responsibility for compensating temporary takings is
therefore quite limited. The constitutional baseline for a LAPP provision
is only to pay for regulations that deprive owners of all beneficial use of
their property for a considerable period, and at least for longer than a
normal delay. Building up from there, however, is an array of different

approaches to temporary takings. A modest increase in property protec134. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Highland Park, 799 N.E.2d 781, 793-94 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (discussing parcel of owner's lots as proper denominator determinative in
regulatory takings claim); Heaphy v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, No. 257941, 2006 WL
1006442, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006) (per curiam) (same).
135. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
136. Id. at 318 ("'[T]emporary' takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his
property[ ] are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation.").
137. See Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("The usual measure ofjust compensation for a temporary taking ... is the fair rental value
of the property for the period of the taking." (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,
338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949))).
138. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321 (2002) ("Resisting '[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either
direction,' we conclude that the circumstances in this case [of temporary taking] are best
analyzed within the Penn Central framework." (citation omitted) (quoting Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 329; (distinguishing between temporary takings and
normal delays); First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (same).
140. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
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tion would set some duration of a taking beyond which the local govern-

ment would have to pay, for example 180 days. If a local government sat
on a building permit application for greater than 180 days, it would then

have to start compensating for the delay the property owner faces before
being allowed to build. The highest level of protection in a LAPP would

award compensation for the entire delay, no matter how brief and how
reasonable. If a government takes only two weeks to respond to a building permit, it nevertheless would have to pay the fair rental value of the

property for those two weeks.
6. Exactions and User Fees. - Exactions refer to fees or in-kind concessions that a local government requires as a condition for allowing

some building or development. 1 4 ' They were designed originally to shift
to the developer the infrastructure costs imposed by the new develop-

ment, like roads, sewers, and even schools.1 42 Over time, they also came
to be used to mitigate additional costs a development might impose on a
neighborhood.14 3 But, as Professor Vicki Been has persuasively argued,

exactions can serve as powerful tools to attract or discourage investment. 144 Costly exactions restrict growth by increasing the costs of devel-

opment; this allows local governments to bid for development by reducing the exactions they will impose.14 5
Under the Supreme Court's proportionality requirement, exactions
must bear some reasonable relationship in both nature and scale to the
costs imposed by the building or development.1 4 6 This, then, is the fed141. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 478-79 ("Exactions require that developers
provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as a condition for receiving
permission for a land use that the local government could otherwise prohibit." (footnote
omitted)). Exactions take many forms, from on-site dedications of property, to off-site
dedications, fees-in-lieu-of-dedication, and impact fees. See id. at 479-80.
142. Id. at 479-82.
143. According to Been, these costs might include "increased traffic congestion,
noise, and environmental degradation." Id. at 482.
144. See id. at 509-11.
145. Id. at 483 ("[A] local government may use exactions to try to discourage all
growth, or to prevent certain kinds of development, such as low- and moderate-income
housing, in order to preserve the exclusiveness of a community or to preserve its fiscal
position."). Been also articulates a subtle argument that exactions can be used to
encourage growth by buying off the opposition of neighbors. Id. In general, though, the
higher the exaction, the more costly the development, and the more anti-development the
exaction is.
146. The Nollan/Dolan test is comprised of two elements. There must be: (1) an
"essential nexus" between the interests served and the required dedication; and (2)
evidence that the dedication is related to the impact of the development in a way that is
"roughly proportional." See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("We think a
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement
of the Fifth Amendment."); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)
(describing requirement of "nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction"); see also D.S. Pensley, Note, Real Cities, Ideal Cities: Proposing a
Test of Intrinsic Fairness for Contested Development Exactions, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 699,
702 (2006) (discussing essential nexus and rough proportionality tests as "dual hallmarks
of the Nollan/Dolan doctrine"). Under some states' constitutional law, exactions must
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eral constitutional baseline, although some state constitutions provide

even greater protection. 14 7

More protective approaches to exactions,

though, would limit the size to some fixed amount per unit of develop-

ment, or limit the use of exactions to specific, enumerated costs like
sewer hookups or parking. The most protective LAPP would preclude
the use of exactions altogether.
7. Vested Rights. - One significant land use controversy relevant to
all developers is the content of the vested rights doctrine. In general,
land use regulations, like zoning, are prospective. Existing buildings and
developments are grandfathered in so that only new uses are subject to
the regulations. This raises the often difficult question of determining
when a right vests. At the time the property is purchased? 148 When a
building permit is issued?1 4 9 When the last discretionary administrative

hurdle has been cleared? 150 Once the property owner has expended substantial sums in reliance on the existing land use regulations?151 As the
preceding footnotes demonstrate, courts have adopted each of these
tests.
As a practical matter, the earlier rights vest, the more property owners are able to rely on the existing property regime. The least protective
regime would make rights vest only at the completion of a building or
development. This could lead to real inefficiencies as property owners
expend substantial amounts of money developing property only to have
the particular use declared impermissible the day before completion.
Not only would this create deadweight losses, it would also force property
owners ex ante to take a steep discount on the value of a project, reflecting the risk of a last minute regulatory change.
At the most protective end of the spectrum, rights would vest at the
purchase of property. This would ensure almost complete stasis in land

use regulations, preventing any prospective change until the property
changed hands. This, too, might create perverse incentives, making some
property far more valuable to the existing owner than to any potential

satisfy a dual rational nexus test, which may be different from the Nollan/Dolanstandard.
See generally Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications-Local
Government Responses to Nollan/DolanTakings Law Issues, 29 Stetson L. Rev. 675 (2000).
147. See Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be
Subjected to Takings Analysis, in Taking Sides on Takings Issues 357, 362 (Thomas E.
Roberts ed., 2002) ("[W]e maintain that the dual rational nexus test is more stringent
when properly applied to impact fees than the Nollan/Dolan takings principles.").
148. See generally Grayson P. Hanes &J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land
Use and Development, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 373, 387 (1989) (suggesting that fee simple
ownership includes development right that does not need "vesting catalyst").
149. E.g., N. Ga. Mountain Crisis Network, Inc. v. City of Blue Ridge, 546 S.E.2d 850,
853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
150. E.g., Avco Cmty. Developers v. S. Coast Reg'I Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 551 (Cal.
1976).
151. E.g., Hussey v. Town of Barrington, 604 A.2d 82, 85 (N.H. 1992).
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purchaser because of the applicable land use regulations.1 5 2 A new regulation that would apply upon sale would create tremendous pressure for
the existing property owner to develop the property to the maximum extent permitted under the old, grandfathered land use regulations, even if
this represents a much higher level of development than he or she otherwise would have chosen.
These two poles on the spectrum of vested rights are theoretically
possible but unlikely to be attractive to many local governments. Far
more likely are the variety of options within these two extremes, from a

test focused on the conduct of the property owner-like vesting rights
upon the substantial reliance by the owner on the existing regulationsto a test focused on the permitting process-like vesting rights upon the
granting of a building permit. Possible LAPP provisions, however, in-

clude all of these options.
8. Amortization. - Once rights vest, many local governments still retain the power to regulate a use out of existence without paying compensation, so long as the use is allowed to exist for long enough to amortize

the cost of the owner's investment.153 Many courts have held that allowing a nonconforming use to continue in existence for a specified
amount of time can count as just compensation. 154
The amortization period varies depending on the nature of the use.
Zoning ordinances prohibiting billboards, for example, can be enacted

without compensating owners of existing billboards so long as they are
given between three and seven years to amortize the investment. 155 Adult
entertainment businesses, another common target of amortization, can
be given as little as ninety days to amortize costs before being forced to
shut down without any additional compensation.155 Nonconforming
buildings, on the other hand, may require as long as forty years to amortize their investments. 15 7

The range of possible LAPP provisions thus includes, at one extreme, forbidding the practice of amortization in lieu ofjust compensation altogether.1 5 8 At the other extreme is using the shortest amortiza152. As the Supreme Court has recognized, this is not a particularly appealing rule.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2001).
153. For a discussion of this practice, see generally Margaret Collins, Methods of
Determining Amortization Periods for Non-Conforming Uses, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 215
(2000).
154. Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1164 n.6 (4th Cir. 1991)
(citing amortization cases).
155. Julian Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and
Development Regulation Law 148 (2003).
156. Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Wash. 1979).
157. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). Gage is a
leading case discussing amortization.
158. Pennsylvania courts already forbid the practice as a taking without just
compensation. Pa. Nw. Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372, 1376
(Pa. 1991).
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tion periods that are constitutionally permissible. Between these two lie
increasingly generous amortization periods during which nonconforming

uses are permitted to continue operating.
9. Development Agreements. - Development agreements represent another response to the problem of vested rights.15 9 They are agreements
between a local government and a developer to preserve the land use
regulations applying to a particular piece of land for a specific amount of

time. As described above, development agreements may be very appealing to developers because they lock current regulations in place for a
definite period of time.1 6 0 Homeowners, or other local taxpayers, may
fear, however, that such deals are not in their best interest and may represent too great a concession by the local government. 16 1 They might
prefer that the local government not give away its power to change the
applicable land use regulations.
In terms of LAPP provisions, then, development agreements represent something of a binary choice. Local governments can elect either to have the power to enter into such agreements or not. If they do
not have the power to enter into development agreements, then any purported bargains with developers would be made unenforceable.
There is room for some additional specificity in the LAPP provisions.
For one, a LAPP can limit the duration of development agreements, making them unenforceable, for example, after ten years. 162 This will prevent a local government from bargaining away its regulatory power for
too long. A LAPP could also require development agreements to demand certain kinds of consideration from the developer. This might include, for example, certain levels of fees or exactions. For some commercial developments-like the expansion of a factory-a LAPP might also
require as a condition for enforceable development agreements a promise from a company to stay in the area or actually create the jobs or other

benefits the company projects. 163
159. The leading article describing development agreements frames them as a
response to the vested rights problem. Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 93, at 669-70.
160. See supra Part I.D.
161. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, 24 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 269, 328 (2005) ("Development and annexation agreement
regimes, as currently adopted, are essentially invitations to local government capture.");
Anne Drost & Jane Matthews Glenn, Mont-Tremblant Resort: An Integrated Approach to
Ecosystem Protection, 26 Vt. L. Rev. 593, 628 (2002) (noting potential for capture of
development agreements by strong economic interests, such as those of resort industry,
over ecological protections).
162. Some statutes require this kind of termination of development agreements. E.g.,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.3229 (West 2006).
163. This would address situations like Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)), in which General Motors forecast tremendous economic
benefits that were never realized. See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 Mich. St. L.
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LAPPs, then, can specify whether or not the local government has

the power to enter into development agreements and, if so, whether
there are any restrictions on their duration and other terms.
The LAPP provisions discussed so far are all focused primarily on the
rights of the owner of regulated property. Two additional LAPP provi-

sions shift the focus to the rights of others to prevent a change in the
regulations applying to others' property. The more robust these protections are, the more local property owners can prevent the relaxation of
existing land use restrictions, and the more settled their expectations can
become. The two LAPP provisions that follow are not arrayed around
takings controversies. Instead, they involve critical issues in land use
more generally that only implicate the Takings Clause when pushed to an
extreme.
10. Requirements for a Variance. -

Variances provide flexibility in a

zoning ordinance. By granting a variance, a board of zoning appeals can
permit a use, or simply an intensity of use, that is impermissible under the

current zone. 164 In theory, the variance is to be a seldom-used escape
valve, limited only to cases where application of the zoning ordinance
works an unnecessary hardship. 165 In fact, most studies agree that vari-

ances are granted in a staggeringly high percentage of cases.1 66 Limiting
the availability of variances would increase certainty in zoning, and allow
greater reliance on existing land uses. The costs of decreased flexibility
would be borne primarily by property owners and developers seeking

more intensive land uses.
The theoretical answer is straightforward and joins a chorus of academic calls for increasing the requirements for granting a variance.1 67
Implementation turns out to be another story, however. First, increasing
Rev. 1005, 1013. Likewise, there are numerous examples where companies extract
regulatory concessions from a local government and then leave the area before creating
promised benefits. Id. at 1012.
164. E.g., Bryden, supra note 109, at 290-91 (describing variances); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1191, 1241 n.222 (2001) [hereinafter Garnett, Castles and
Commerce] (same); David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and
Recommendations for Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 279,
280-82 (2004) (same).
165. Owens, supra note 164, at 287 ("[T]he common tenor set very early was that the
power of variation is to be sparingly exercised and only in rare instances and under
exceptional circumstances peculiar in their nature . . . .'" (quoting Hammond v. Bd. of
Appeal of Bldg. Dep't of Springfield, 154 N.E. 82, 83 (Mass. 1926))).
166. See id. at 295-96 (citing studies showing between 70% and 80% approval rates
in local governments of all sizes).
167. See, e.g., 2 Stuart Meck, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes
for Planning and the Management of Change 10-53 (rev. ed. 2002) (proposing increased
requirements for granting variance); Garnett, Castles and Commerce, supra note 164, at
1241 n.222 (citing sources expressing concern over liberal variance practices); Jonathan S.
Klavens, At the Edge of Environmental Adjudication: An Administrative Takings Variance,
18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 277, 307 n.118 (1994) (same).
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the legal standard may have at best a limited effect, because most zoning

boards charged with granting variances are staffed by laypeople who
make their decisions informally and in relative secrecy. 168 Moreover, a
recent study in North Carolina reveals that only 7% of variance decisions
were appealed to a court, further limiting the effect of an increased legal

standard. 169
The most promising approaches to limiting the use of variances include procedural changes to the variance process. There is an increasing
trend nationally to require boards of zoning appeals to make written findings justifying a variance.1 70 This serves as an important record in the
event of an appeal and also increases transparency and political accountability even without resort to the courts. 171

A more profound procedural change would redefine the trigger for
judicial review. Now, only people suffering pecuniary damage have standing to challenge a variance in court. 172 Expanding this group will increase the likelihood ofjudicial oversight of the variance process. Under
one proposal, a zoning ombudsman would be appointed to oversee the

zoning process. 173 Alternatively, any property owner within a local government could be given standing to sue. This latter alternative could appropriately reflect the broader community-based concerns that changes
in land use often implicate, whether or not property values suffer directly
and quantifiably.
Increased procedural requirements, and increased opportunities for
oversight, would limit the use of variances and therefore better police the
boundaries of the zoning ordinance. Of course-and this is the important if unorthodox point-not all local governments are likely to want
these increased protections. Limiting the availability of variances is not
168. See Owens, supra note 164, at 298 (describing system that "failed to provide even
the minimum degree of fair play"). Owens updates the traditional concerns with variances
by offering new statistics on the use of variances in North Carolina in 2002. Still, variances
were granted 72% of the time. Id. at 309.
169. See id. at 303 n.110 (citing David W. Owens & Adam Bruggemann, Survey of
Experience with Zoning Variances (UNC Inst. of Gov't, Special Series No. 18, Feb. 2004),
available at http://ncinfo.iog.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pdfs/zonvar.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
170. See id. at 307-08 ("The most common means used to prepare the findings is to
include them in the minutes of the board making the decision rather than as a separate
decision document.").
171. Other proposed changes include changing the qualification requirements for
serving on a board of zoning appeals. See id. at 300.
172. E.g., Cmty. Planning Bd. No. 2 v. Bd. of Standards & Appeals, 350 N.Y.S.2d 138,
140 (App. Div. 1973) ("[N]earby owner of rentable property may well suffer pecuniary
damage from the downgrading of his neighborhood by disorder, and such damage is the
usual measure of the status of 'aggrieved person.'"); see also Delaney et al., supra note 24,
§ 12:2 (describing standing rules).
173. See Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory,
Destructive in Practice, 29 Md. L. Rev. 3, 21 (1969) (stating that ombudsman proposal
would make "preservation of the zoning ordinance and protection it affords to various
neighborhoods ...
a public duty").
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necessarily an improvement for the zoning process generally. It comes

with costs to developers and those who traditionally benefit from variances, making local governments with strict variance limits less attractive

to them. On the other hand, such limits make local governments more
attractive to property owners who want certainty in land use controls and
want to limit growth. The most protective regime for regulated property
owners is therefore the current one, with de facto flexibility in issuing

variances. Increased procedural rules occupy a middle ground, and the
least protective option-the one giving the greatest rights to neighborsalso includes expanded standing to challenge variances.
11. Requiring Greater Consistency with the General Plan. -

In addition

to granting a variance, a local government can change the permissible
uses of property by rezoning it. The greater the local government's ability to rezone, the less property owners can rely on the existing zoning
regulations. Of course, property can be rezoned to benefit developers by
upzoning to permit more intensive uses, or to benefit neighbors by
downzoning to limit use. 174 Both upzoning and downzoning can take
many specific forms, from changing the intensity of permissible uses
through minimum lot sizes and the like, to redefining the zoning ordinance to change the uses permitted in a type of zone, to actually changing the use classification of a particular property.1 75
One check on local rezonings of property is the consistency requirement. Under the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), a zoning
ordinance must be consistent with the general plan. 17 6 The SZEA ap-

pears to have contemplated local governments preparing two separate
documents: a comprehensive plan, and a zoning ordinance consistent
with that comprehensive plan. 17 7 Although some states have found the
SZEA's "consistency" requirement met solely with reference to the zoning
ordinance itself-in effect, forgoing the need for a separate comprehen-

sive plan-many states do, in fact, require two documents, either by statute or through judicial interpretation. 178 The more teeth given to the
174. See William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws 22 (1985) (defining
upzoning and downzoning).
175. See Delaney et al., supra note 24, § 20:1 (discussing forms of downzoning).
176. See Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement That Zoning and Land Use
Controls Be Consistent with an Independently Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan: A
Model Statute, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 295, 298 (2000) [hereinafter Meck, Legislative
Requirement] (reviewing history and provisions of the SZEA's zoning plan requirement).
177. Courts and commentators have disagreed about whether the SZEA was intended
to require a separate comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the
Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 901-02 (1976)
("It is not clear whether [the SZEA was] intended to require that zoning be consistent with
a comprehensive plan . . . ."). For a compelling historical reconstruction of the SZEA
concluding that its drafters did intend to require a separate plan, see Meck, Legislative
Requirement, supra note 176, at 299-306.
178. Compare Kozesnik v. Twp. of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7-8 (N.J. 1957)
(interpreting New Jersey's zoning statutory scheme), with Cal. Gov't Code §§ 65350-65362
(West 1997) (delineating California's comprehensive zoning plan), and Fasano v. Bd. of
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consistency requirement, the less a local government will be able to re-

zone property, either through upzoning or downzoning.
Because of the reciprocal nature of upzonings and downzonings, decreased flexibility in rezoning does not obviously benefit one group of

property owners over another. In reality, however, restricting rezoning is
a more important tool for existing neighbors than for developers. Developers receive other protections from downzonings, like the vested rights
doctrine and the ability to enter into development agreements locking in

existing land use controls.' 7 9 Neighbors, on the other hand, have no
comparable judicial protections from upzonings of nearby property.
Ratcheting up the consistency requirement gives neighbors a way to police the status quo and limit new development.

Property owners who

want more assurance that the existing zoning regime will remain in place
into the future will prefer requiring more consistency between zoning

and planning.
Increasing the consistency requirement means, first and foremost,
mandating a separate comprehensive plan. 18 0 Once the plan has been
drafted, courts can also apply greater scrutiny to the consistency determination, giving it even greater bite. 18 1 This can be accomplished by defining rezonings as quasi-judicial instead of legislative, thereby justifying
more searching review than the rational basis test that often applies. 8 2

Again, the entire array of options, from not requiring a separate plan, to
requiring a separate plan and providing searching review for consistency
with the plan, are all available choices in a LAPP.

County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28 (Or. 1973) (discussing comprehensive plan enacted by
Oregon state legislature). All three sources, inter alia, are cited in Meck, Legislative
Requirement, supra note 176, at 305 nn.24-25, 307 n.29.
179. For a discussion of each of these protections, see supra Parts II.B.7 & II.B.9,
respectively.
180. Some scholarship suggests that such a requirement results in higher quality
planning. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Planning and the Law, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 657, 658
(1996).
181. See, e.g., Fasano, 507 P.2d at 27 (applying heightened scrutiny to zoning
changes). For a comparison of different judicial approaches in recent cases, see Edward J.
Sullivan, The Evolving Role of the Comprehensive Plan, 32 Urb. Law. 813 passim (2000).
182. For a discussion of the distinction between quasi-judicial and legislative land use
decisions, see Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 871-73 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and
Dealing].
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LAPP

Middle Ground

Most Protective

Any public purpose,

Prohibitions on tak-

Prohibiting all con-

conterminous with
the police power

ings for economic
development or
other substantive

demnations

limits
Compensation

Fair market value

Market value plus

Restitution measured

additional specified

by the government's

damages, or plus a
percentage kicker

gain

Diminution of Value

85% reduction in
market value

Fixed percentage
diminution of value
less than 85%

Requiring compensation for any loss of
value

Denominator

All property wherever situated

Only local or contiguous property

Only the burdened
lot

Temporary Takings

Compensation only

Compensation for

Compensation for

for total denials of

delay beyond a fixed

the entire period of

use for extended
time

duration

delay

Reasonable relation
to the costs imposed

Limited to specific
dollar amounts, or

No exactions

Exactions

specific kinds of
costs
Vested Rights

Vest upon completion

Vest upon substantial
reliance

Vest upon purchase
of the property

Amortization

Reasonable duration

Long duration

Not permitted

Development
Agreements

Not allowed

Allowed with time
limitations

Allowed

Variances

New procedural
requirements and
more lenient standing

New procedural
requirements

No new limits on
variances

Consistency with the
Plan

Separate plan, and
heightened scrutiny

Separate plan

No separate plan

C. The General Requirements
In addition to the specific choices available to local governments,
LOPP legislation would also have to include certain general requirements
to satisfy various political and economic concerns. These include the
following.
1. Uniform Application to Local Property. - For a LAPP to function
properly, it must meet the same kind of uniformity requirements that
apply to zoning ordinances so that similar uses are not subject to different
kinds of property protection.1 8 3 In zoning, this requirement prevents
183. The uniformity requirement is a kind of statutory equal protection requirement.
See John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 621 (1972) ("[C]ommentators are in general agreement
that the statutory requirement of uniformity duplicates the constitutional requirement of
equal protection.").
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parcel-by-parcel regulation, thus limiting the risk of zoning that targets
individuals instead of regulating uses. 184 The same concern applies to
LAPPs, and a uniformity requirement would prevent LAPPs from making
a particular bargain with an individual developer enforceable, or from

singling out a particular
burdens.1 85

property owner

for harsher

regulatory

For some local governments, particularly smaller local governments

seeking to restrict growth, all local property may be subject to a single
LAPP. Other local governments, however, may want to distinguish between the LAPP protections that apply to commercial and residential
property, or make even more fine-grained distinctions. A LAPP can pro-

vide a new set of regulatory commitments overlying the zoning map, so
that property zoned "Light Industrial," for example, not only comes with

a specific set of permitted uses but also with a set of regulatory precommitments specifying how the zoning law will be applied and what the consequences of a change in the applicable land use regulations will be for

the government.
Importantly, a uniformity requirement is likely to minimize the impact of special interest groups in adopting a LAPP. A significant risk surrounding the actual selection of a LAPP is the potential influence of developers or other groups with specific interests that diverge from those of
the rest of the community.1 86 Where conditions are ripe for spot-zoning

(or reverse spot-zoning), the conditions are equally ripe for spot-LAPP
adoption, targeting specific individuals or interest groups for benefits or
burdens based solely on their political influence instead of the good of
the community.1 8 7 Requiring uniformity does not by itself prevent such
self-interest, but it makes it harder and more costly to effectuate, given
184. See id. at 621 n.178 ("The chief draftsman of the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act has written that the purpose of the uniformity requirement is 'to make it
understood that all property situated alike [would] be treated alike.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Edward M. Bassett, Zoning 50 (reprinted with additions 1940))); see
also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978) (describing
impermissible, "'reverse spot'" zoning as a "land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones").
185. Development agreements provide the most likely method of providing propertyowner-specific land use regulations. See supra Part II.B.9.
186. I have previously argued that small, local governments tend to be dominated by
homeowner majorities, minimizing the risk of special interest group capture. See Serkin,
Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1646-52 (discussing Fischel's Homevoter Hypothesis); see
also supra note 32 and infra notes 272-277 and accompanying text (same). The adoption
of a LAPP poses a more serious risk, however, because it is a one-time choice for the local
government. This situation makes special interest group pressure more likely. Moreover,
there is no doubt that special interest groups enjoy a considerable political advantage in
larger local governments.
187. The phenomenon of spot-zoning is well developed in the land use literature.
See, e.g., Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., "Spot Zoning"-A Spot That Could Be Removed from
the Law, 48 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 117, 134-37 (1995) (defining spot-zoning as
"a description of a process of singling-out a particular piece of property for treatment that
differs from that accorded neighboring properties" but arguing that "spot zoning"
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the requirement that LAPP provisions cannot be tailored to individuals

or specific parcels of land. Additional protection along these lines should
come from the built-in protection of a sunset provision, taken up next.
2. Sunset Provision. - In its purest form, this Article's proposal contemplates local governments making a one-time election of the property
protection they will then offer forever. This allows for the greatest reliance by property owners and precipitates the most effective sorting of
owners according to local property regime.

The benefits of a LAPP

precommitment must be weighed against the cost of decreased flexibility,
however.

The perfect LAPP today may not be so perfect tomorrow.

Some measure of flexibility is therefore important, but not so much that
it undermines the LAPP's benefits.
In an imaginary world with perfect information, a LAPP's effect on
property values would reflect the importance of retaining flexibility to
account for changes in local conditions. In the real world, a one-time
LAPP enactment will inevitably lead to long-term winners and losers in
the competition between local governments. 188 Inevitably, then, some
LAPPs will be the result of special interest group capture, while others
will reflect shortsightedness by a majority of property owners.1 89 Either
could have dire long-term consequences for a municipality. The draconian response is that creating some perennial losers is the necessary re-

sult of satisfying preferences for property protection as effectively as possible. Moreover, the current system fares no better distributionally. The
gap between the wealthiest and poorest local governments continues to
widen.1 9 0 LOPP legislation with a one-time election at least gives local
governments one more opportunity than they currently have to level the

playing field by offering competitive property protection.
Given the likelihood of some political failures and miscalculations
about the long-term effects of a LAPP, it is important to consider other,
less callous alternatives. The first is to create voting procedures that minimize the risk of special interest group capture. The most obvious would
be to require some form of supermajority.1 9 1 With turnout in local electerminology is unhelpful because "the term covers a number of grounds and lacks
precision").
188. This kind of interregional competition has been called the "second war between
the states." See The Second War Between the States, Bus. Wk., May 17, 1976, at 92, 92,
quoted in Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 401 & n.125
(1996).
189. For a more complete discussion of both of these problems, see infra text
accompanying notes 228-229.
190. See, e.g., Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1678 (describing flight from
cities to outer-ring suburbs).
191. Since LAPPs can be thought of as a kind of local constitutional commitment, a
supermajority requirement might seem particularly apt. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 89 (2005)
(noting that constitutional rules can usually be overruled only by legislative
supermajorities).
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tions notoriously low, however, this may still not be enough to prevent

frequent special interest group capture. 192 Moreover, it does nothing to
combat the potential problem of shortsighted majorities-even
supermajorities-adopting an ultimately harmful LAPP.

An alternative response would allow future amendment or rejection
of a LAPP through the political process. Of course, the rules for changing a LAPP must require something other than a simple majority or the
LOPP proposal would add nothing to the current system of local land use
control. One option, then, would be to require symmetrical voting rules
for adopting and for modifying a LAPP. If a supermajority is required to
adopt a LAPP, a supermajority could also undo it. This proposal goes too
far in the other direction, however, providing insufficient stability in a
LAPP regime. Supermajorities are relatively easy to come by in local governments, especially in small ones.19 3 Making LAPPs this easy to undo
significantly limits the benefits of the LOPP proposal.
The best tradeoff between flexibility and rigid precommitment is a
preset sunset provision setting the duration of local LAPPs, coupled with
a supermajority requirement for adopting the LAPP in the first place. To
be clear, the state legislation itself does not expire, but each individual
LAPP would lapse after a fixed amount of time measured from the date
of local adoption. Until its natural expiration under the statute, the
LAPP cannot be changed or repealed. The sunset provision would have
to be quite long because of the investment horizon for most property.
Some period between fifteen and thirty years might best serve the twin
goals of reliance and flexibility. Finally, adding a supermajority require-

ment would minimize special interest group pressure in the LAPP adoption process.1 9 4
This solution is still not perfect. A LAPP's benefits will decrease over
time as the sunset date approaches. Property values might become quite
volatile as the date of expiration approaches and uncertainty over longterm property protection increases. This cost can again be minimized by
including some relatively long period between the nonrenewal of a LAPP
and its actual expiration. Imagine here a LAPP with a twenty-year sunset
provision. Voters could vote after fifteen years whether to renew or not,
and if they choose not to, the LAPP will lose its force only after five more
192. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 31-47 (2000) (describing local voter
turnout that affects state and local, as well as national, elections and noting nationwide
decline in all forms of political participation, especially at local level). But see Fischel,
Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 89-90 (noting that low local voter turnout may be
"sign of satisfaction" and that "serious controversy can easily double or triple the
participation rate").
193. The smaller the government, the more majoritarian it is likely to be. For a list of
sources supporting this point, see Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1644 n.76.
194. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
Constitutional Solution, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 365, 372 (1999) ("[Supermajority rules]
may promote a more harmonious political existence by making it harder for interest
groups to acquire other people's resources for themselves.").
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years. 195 In effect, the overhang between the vote to amend or revoke a
LAPP and its actual change functions as a statutory amortization period
for reliance on the LAPP.1 96
An alternative, consistent with this Article's overall proposal, would

be to allow local governments to choose for themselves the rules for enacting, amending, and repealing a LAPP. Some could choose to make
LAPPs truly perpetual, others could choose to make LAPPs revocable by
supermajorities.19 7 The harder a local government makes it to change a
LAPP, the more it benefits from-or potentially is harmed by-the level
of property protection it selects. This has more theoretical than practical

appeal. Special interest groups are just as likely to capture the process for
deciding the terms for amending or revoking a LAPP as they are the substance of the LAPP provisions. It is therefore no real protection at all to

allow local governments a choice in this dimension. A sunset provision in
the enabling LOPP legislation is the better solution.
Admittedly, the combination of a supermajority requirement, inflexibility during the duration of a LAPP, and a preestablished date for termi-

nation can only minimize, not eliminate, the costs of special interest
group capture and bad decisionmaking by local majorities. There is no

guarantee against giveaways to special interests or shortsightedness by existing property owners. This, however, is not fatal to the proposal because the same problems exist now. The question is whether the LOPP
legislation will exacerbate or mitigate them. By focusing public attention
on the problem of creating the right level of investment incentives, the
process for adopting a LAPP may actually be better, in the long run, than
the largely bilateral and below-the-radar planning decisions that larger
local governments make now, including entering into development
agreements.1 98 Moreover, the LOPP proposal has to be judged against

the realities of the current system in which a one-size-fits-all property regime already burdens certain local governments disproportionately. Ulti-

195. This is consistent with the approach taken by many bilateral investment
treaties-the principal international mechanism for generating foreign direct investment.
See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 757, 771 (2000) (describing termination provisions in bilateral investment
treaties). Another alternative would allow voters to amend a LAPP at any time, but with
the amendments only becoming effective after a relatively long waiting period, say two or
five years, to vindicate property owners' reliance interests. This proposal, however, could
result in the unsettling situation where a LAPP is amended several times before any of the
amendments become effective. The first amendment to become effective would therefore
have already been repealed by subsequent amendments and yet would still be in force for
some time.
196. For a discussion of amortization, see supra Part II.B.8.
197. There is no need for a LAPP that can be changed by majority vote because this is
or at least approximates the existing system and does not present the entrenchment
problem that necessitates the LOPP. For a discussion of entrenchment, see supra notes
102-105 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part I.D (describing development agreements).
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mately, the benefits of this proposal should easily outweigh any potential

costs, as the next Part demonstrates.
III.

STRUCTURAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE

LOPP PROPOSAL
Having fleshed out the details of the LOPP proposal, this Part focuses on some of the benefits and costs of allowing local governments to

precommit to certain kinds of property protection. A principal benefit of
the proposal is that LOPP legislation will shift at least some, if not most,
litigation away from the Takings Clause and to the LOPP statutes instead.
Allowing courts an opportunity to avoid constitutional rulings will ratchet

down the stakes of the property debate, but may also make courts more
willing to extend property protection to individual property owners in
more cases.
Second, in the muddled area of takings law, certainty about the rules
is itself a benefit. Individual LAPPs will allow both governments and
property owners alike to know in advance what actions will be compensable, and this will increase the quality and efficiency of their
decisionmaking.
Some disadvantages are important to acknowledge, too. The first is
the potential impact on settled property rights and, closely related, the
impact on the poor and on locally undesirable uses. There is a trend
away from local autonomy in land use issues because of the regional effect of local land use decisions. LOPP legislation, with its focus on in-

terlocal competition, relies on local sovereignty around land use issues,
and this is at least in tension with the regionalism movement.
The second disadvantage of LOPP legislation is that it might invite
regulatory forum shopping. Where a local government has precommitted not to regulate in a particular way, there is no guarantee that the state
or the federal government will not come in and regulate where the local
government has said it will not. LAPPs therefore provide imperfect pro-

tection, the limits of which need to be acknowledged.
A. The Benefits of Statutory Protection
The disarray in takings jurisprudence is the subject of frequent criticism by courts and commentators alike.1 99 Nevertheless, rigid rules
might be even worse. 200 The reason, simply, is that any precise definition

of property protection threatens to ratchet up or down the scope of the
199. See, e.g., Eduardo Moises Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum. L. Rev.
2182, 2186 & n.18 (2004) (collecting claims of takings law's unintelligibility).
200. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 600
(1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud] (arguing that "crystalline rules seem less the
king of the efficiency mountain than we may normally assume"); cf. Ted Janger, Crystals
and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 Ariz. L. Rev.
559, 614 (2001) (identifying similar "wrongheaded infatuation with crystalline statutory
drafting" in bankruptcy context).
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Takings Clause against all governments for all kinds of actions, and these
do not all implicate the same underlying concerns. Most takings cases
are not strictly limited to their facts, and an expansion in the definition of

property rights against the government in one case can easily spill over
into others. 20 1 Likewise, expanding a government's authority to act in
one case can be taken by others as carte blanche for similar authority in
the future, even if different facts would actually implicate very different
substantive concerns. 202
Of course, this is by no means unique to takings law; any constitutional litigation poses the same problem. It is, however, particularly pernicious in the takings context because of the inability of courts to identify
even the relevant variables for distinguishing one case from another.

Should the purpose of the government action matter, for example,
whether it is a regulation to protect public health, the environment, or
just wealthy constituents' views of the ocean? 203 Does the government
actor matter? That is, should it make a difference whether government
action is undertaken by the federal government, the state, a local government, or an agency? I have previously argued that it should, 2 04 but courts
have not, by and large, taken up the call. The list of possible variables is
long indeed and courts are left making the frequent pronouncement that
identifying a taking is an ad hoc factual inquiry. 205
The consequences of government liability would be far less dire if

they were the result of statutory instead of constitutional interpretation. 206

This is especially true if LOPP legislation and the resulting

201. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 220, 233-34 (2003)
(relying in part on extensions of Takings Clause to government appropriations of rooftops
for cable television access and private airspace for governmental planes to further extend
Takings Clause to "interest on lawyers' trust accounts").
202. Kelo is a good example of this fear. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005); see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing Kelo fear). Alternatively,
courts may gloss over or simply ignore earlier cases implicating different concerns, even if
the holdings in those cases appear to be on point. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Valuing
Interest: Net Harm and Fair Market Value in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 37
Ind. L. Rev. 417, 427-29 (2004) [hereinafter Serkin, Valuing Interest] (describing
inconsistencies between Hodel v. Irving and Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, and
failure by the Court in Brown even to cite Hodel).
203. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property
131-38 (2006) (identifying focus in German law on public purpose of government
regulations of property).
204. Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1697-98.
205. E.g., Parkwood Homes, Inc. v. City of Rockwood, No. 05-CV-72708-DT, 2006 WL
508647, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2006) ("The Supreme Court has held that regulatory
takings cases are characterized by ad hoc, highly factual inquiries."); Allegretti & Co. v.
County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 128 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[R]egulatory takings
challenges are governed by the 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries' .... " (quoting Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
206. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1185 (2003) ("[Sjtatutes are
significantly easier to amend than the Constitution, sharply raising the stakes in
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LAPPs are rolled out slowly over time. The LAPP provision adopted by
one municipality could be subjected to judicial scrutiny and interpretation before other local governments decide to adopt it. Moreover, if
courts interpret the provision differently than the state intended, the

state could modify the LOPP statute without recourse to a constitutional
amendment. 207
B. Increased Certainty of Property Rules
A constant refrain among courts and takings scholars is that takings
law is in a state of perpetual disarray. There is some reason to think that,
as a matter of constitutional law, this vagueness has its benefits or is at
least an inevitable result of hard choices in hard cases. 20 8 But increased
certainty in this arena comes with substantial benefits. 209
The current vague takings standard makes it very difficult for local
governments and property owners alike to predict how the Takings
Clause will apply in many cases. This creates inefficiencies for both parties. From the government's perspective, uncertainty about takings liability may lead risk averse local government decisionmakers to underregulate. 2 10 The stakes of liability are so high, especially for small local
governments, that they may overestimate the likelihood of liability. 21 ' A
clearer definition of takings liability will allow more accurate cost-benefit

decisions since local decisionmakers will not have to rely on reading tea
leaves to determine whether the government will be held liable.

From a property owner's perspective, increased certainty also
reduces the risk of investing in property. Now, any cost-benefit analysis
about a new development must include some risk that the government
will erect or enforce regulatory hurdles, greatly increasing costs. 212 Even
commitments by local decisionmakers will not eliminate the risk, beconstitutional interpretation where mistakes in interpretation may not be so easily
reversed."). Of course, the consequences to an individual town of an undesirable property
regime may be no different whether its source is the Takings Clause or a LAPP, but the
systemwide costs of property protection are much lower.
207. Of course, local governments should not be able to amend the LAPPs so easily
for fear of attempts to strategically change the terms of the property protection afforded by
the LAPP, in direct contravention of the point of the precommitment. See Part II.C.2.
208. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 Cardozo L.
Rev. 93, 93 (2002) ("[T]he vagueness in takings doctrine is quite functional and entirely
appropriate."); Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 200, at 600 (calling into question
efficiency of "crystalline rules").
209. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1449-50 (2000) (decrying uncertainty in takings rules); cf. Daniel J.
Curtin, Jr., Foreword to Taking Sides on Takings Issues, supra note 147, at xxi ("Takings
law is notoriously complex, and a desire for clarity exists among many of those who must
deal with it.").
210. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1666-74.
211. See id.
212. See Kaplow, supra note 56, at 522-36 (analyzing risk and incentive effects of
uncertainty about future government policy).
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cause, as already noted, such commitments are presently unenforceable
unless they take the form of formal development agreements.2 1 3 Making

these commitments enforceable increases the expected value of a development by limiting the risk of adverse local regulatory actions. To the
extent potential investors now try to assess that risk by divining the regulatory climate in a particular locality, the existence of a LAPP will greatly

reduce information costs.
Viewed through another lens, predictability in property regimes adds
to the overall fairness of the regulatory system. 214

If property owners

know ahead of time what regulations will apply, they are able to choose
whether or not to invest. As Professor Carol Rose explains: "One protects oneself against the predictable evil by not participating in the risky
venture, by not purchasing the property that needs the seldom-granted

zoning change."2 1 5 Increased certainty about applicable property protection therefore increases the fairness of local property regimes.
C. Interference with Settled Property Rights
Adopting a LAPP at the initial incorporation of a local government is

one thing.

Adopting one midstream seems quite different.

Once

adopted, a LAPP will not affect all local property owners the same way

and will undoubtedly create relative winners and losers. The question,
then, is how a local government can adopt a LAPP now, potentially

changing settled expectations about property rights.
As a first response, it is important to reiterate that the takings baseline still applies so that no one will end up with less property protection

than he or she currently enjoys. The LOPP proposal will undoubtedly
have different long-term effects on different people, but it will not under-

mine anyone's existing property rights. It may, however, have an adverse
impact on property values, and that raises distributional concerns that

need to be addressed.
There are two specific risks in adopting a LAPP. The first is the risk
of overregulation, driving up the costs of new development, excluding
newcomers, and thwarting prodevelopment factions within a local government. The specific concern is that local majorities will ignore the interests of minority groups, including the interests of outsiders, developers, and others with a softer political voice, and adopt a LAPP that
maximizes the government's power to engage in highly restrictive land
use regulations. The second concern is the opposite one, that local governments will overprotect property and therefore underregulate. This

may occur either because local majorities discount the costs associated
with property protection or, more likely, because adoption of a LAPP will
213.
214.
Dealing,
215.

See supra Part I.D (describing development agreements).
Carol Rose persuasively links foreseeability with fairness. See Rose, Planning and
supra note 182, at 907-08.
Id. at 908.
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sometimes result from special interest group pressure to the detriment of

the majority of property owners. 216 To put it starkly, special interest
groups, like developers or commercial interests, may receive greater

property protection under specific LAPPs at the expense of everyone else.
Ratcheting up property protection to prevent exactions, for example,
might dramatically increase the cost of new development to existing tax-

payers who will have to bear more of the cost of new infrastructure. Both
problems are addressed in turn.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the problem of underprotecting property
and thereby overregulating is likely to result where a LAPP adoption process is controlled by local homeowners, the dominant political group in
most small governments. 2 17 Why would a local property owner want to
limit the local protection of his or her property? Because, having already
locked in his or her own land use, decreased property protection actually
means an increase in the regulatory burdens on those coming after.2 18
Homeowners, at least self-interested ones, are likely to want to benefit
from the lax regulation of their own property and then kick that ladder
of permissiveness down behind them, subjecting any newcomers to more
stringent regulations. The predictable result is local property owners
choosing a LAPP that gives the greatest regulatory latitude while preserving the most stringent limitations on granting variances and rezonings.
By limiting the supply of new buildings, newcomers would have to pay a
premium to buy into the town. A highly protective LAPP therefore
amounts to a transfer of wealth from newcomers (who have to pay more

for property) to existing property owners (who receive more for their
property).
This kind of LAPP also threatens existing owners of low-valued property. Land use regulations may be designed to eliminate mobile homes,
for example, or other property that is perceived to be a drag on local
property values. 2 19 This can put a particularly mean spin on the Tiebout
Hypothesis where regulatory burdens are placed on people without the
resources to move. 22 0 At least some of the benefits ofjurisdictional competition are only available to people who can pay the ante to move to a
place that better satisfies their preferences. Under this view, LAPPs will
216. For a discussion of public choice theory, see sources cited supra note 96.
217. The smaller the local government the greater this threat. See Ellicksorn, supra
note 80, at 405 ("If the majoritarian model reflects reality anywhere, however, it is in small
municipalities."); Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 87-92.
218. This is a function of the vested rights doctrine, considered supra Part II.B.7.
219. See, e.g., City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 685 P.2d 821, 826 (Idaho 1984)
(upholding statute requiring removal of mobile home because statute was held to be
rationally related to protecting property values); City of Brookside Vill. v. Comeau, 633
S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex. 1982) (upholding ordinance restricting mobile homes in order to
protect property values).
220. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 23, at 1411 ("The often significant costs of movement
mean that locational decisions reflect personal wealth rather than preference."). For a
description of the Tiebout Hypothesis, see supra Part I.C.
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do nothing to increase the overall welfare of people who are trapped by
economics or other factors in a municipality that adopts a LAPP antithetical to their interests.

As a first response to the problem of majoritarian interest in overregulation, this political dynamic is independent of the LOPP proposal.
Exclusionary zoning and all forms of growth control are ubiquitous issues
in the land use and takings literature and in the case law. 221 Because
LAPPs do not expand the available slate of land use regulations, the problem of overregulation is the same under the LOPP proposal as under
existing law. If a local government chooses to retain the broadest range

of regulatory power by adopting a highly permissive LAPP, it is in precisely the same position all local governments currently occupy.
Additionally, a LAPP creates systemic constraints on the use of

growth controls driven by property owners' desire to increase local property values. 222 This, in turn, ensures diversity among local property regimes because not all local governments maximize property values by re-

taining the broadest possible regulatory power. In some situations,
property values are indeed best preserved by preventing new development to the greatest extent possible and excluding newcomers. In many,
if not most, situations, however, property values will be enhanced by at-

tracting at least some kinds of development, whether commercial development to increase the tax base, or high-end residential development to
drive up property values generally, under the rising-tide-lifts-all-boats the-

ory of property values. 223 A homeowner majority therefore adopts the
least protective LAPP at its peril. Such a community will find itself at a
relative disadvantage in the competition for new business and development. Even local governments dominated by homeowner majorities are
likely to adopt LAPPs that reflect some outsiders' interests and, in particular, some commercial and developer interests.
Local homeowner majorities using regulations to increase their
property values may sometimes raise distributional concerns, permitting
existing property owners to benefit at the expense of newcomers, but this
is not qualitatively different from any successful local initiative, like im-

proving the quality of the schools or the level of services provided. To
put a different and more positive gloss on the effect of a LAPP, newcomers are, in fact, willing to pay more to buy into a local government because they are receiving more in return, namely, an enforceable commitment to the property regime that they want. All of this is to say that
underprotection of property is less of a concern where homeowners are
221. E.g., Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 37-72 (2001) (discussing judicial responses to exclusionary zoning).
222. See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 4; Serkin, Big Differences,
supra note 2, at 1655-61 (discussing local governments' responsiveness to property values).
223. Cf. Andres Duany, Three Cheers for Gentrification, Am. Enterprise, Apr.-May
2001, at 36, 37 (describing gentrification as a "rising tide that lifts all boats"), quoted in
Ellickson & Been, supra note 100, at 10.
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internalizing the costs and benefits of their decisions. 2 24 Homeowners
will bear the consequences of a badly drawn LAPP. Property values will
fall if development and growth are curtailed too much.
No doubt, there may remain some systemwide biases against truly

undesirable local uses that are nevertheless important for society. A
wealthy town that chooses to retain broad regulatory power may want to
exercise that power to exclude poor families with children, to take a likely
example. 225 If too many local governments adopt the property regime
that best prevents certain undesirable uses, then no amount of Tieboutstyle sorting will provide for them, or at least enough of them. This problem is again hardly unique to the LOPP proposal, however, and property
protection turns out to be a remarkably crude tool for fighting exclusionary zoning. The challenge of low-income housing and a local government's regional responsibilities are better taken up elsewhere in the law.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's famous Mt. Laurel decision provides
one avenue, requiring local governments to provide their fair share of
low-income housing.226 Statutory responses, including a shift toward regional planning, provide another useful approach. Regionalism seems
particularly in vogue, with its emphasis on the negative externalities of
local land use decisions. 2 27
Removing local governments' ability to exclude the poor is not at all

inconsistent with this Article's proposal for local property protection.
There are many reasons beyond exclusionary zoning why a local government might want to retain robust regulatory powers, from environmental
protection, to preservation of a downtown, to aesthetic regulations and
the prevention of gentrification, to name just a few. A mandate to permit
low-income housing will not undermine these other reasons for local
land use regulations.
224. For a lengthier discussion of when homeowners do, in fact, internalize costs and
benefits, see Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1655-65.
225. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 452 ("The normal profit-maximizing strategy of a
suburb dominated by a homeowner majority is to discourage construction of modestpriced housing suitable for occupancy by families with school-age children."); see also Jerry
Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1083-84 (1996) (identifying
property values as one reason property owners seek to exclude "the wrong kind of
people"); Sterk, Competition, supra note 19, at 837-38 (describing incentives to exclude
poor residents).
226. See S. Burlington NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
227. At least some scholars have proposed explicitly replacing local governments with
regional governments. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
2255, 2270-76 (2003) (describing this approach). For an introduction to regionalismsometimes called "metropolitanism"-see Orfield, supra note 77, at 10-14; see also
William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on
Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood," 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 881, 890-95 (1999)
[hereinafter Fischel, NIMBY Syndrome] (describing shift from local government to
metropolitan government). For an interesting proposal to deal with the externalities
generated by local governments, see Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92
Va. L. Rev. 929, 962-76 (2006).
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Overprotection of property through the adoption of a highly restrictive LAPP is the flip side of the problem. A local government that gives
away too much regulatory power may find itself at the mercy of develop-

ers and others who impose net costs instead of generating net benefits.
That is, they consume more resources than they contribute in taxes, fees,
and other sources of revenue.

Existing property owners have a strong incentive not to permit overprotection and the consequent underregulation of property because of

the negative impact on property values. But what if property owners are
systemically shortsighted about the costs and benefits of different LAPP
provisions? 228 Property owners' investment horizon tends to be quite
long but may nevertheless be short relative to the life of a local government. Moreover, adoption of a LAPP will sometimes result from special
interest group pressure to the detriment of property values. 229 Ratchet-

ing up property protection to prevent exactions, for example, might dramatically increase the cost of new development to existing taxpayers who
will have to bear more of the cost of new infrastructure.
For cities, in particular, the problem is acute. Some kinds of concessions for commercial interests may be entirely appropriate. Figuring out
what LAPP provisions to adopt, however, will implicate tradeoffs that are
likely to be altogether too complex for the average voter to comprehend
in more than a superficial way. 23 0 The conditions are therefore ripe for
special interest groups to take control of LAPP adoptions and engineer

bargains that are good for them but potentially bad for the city as a
whole. 23 1
There is no magic slipknot to prevent local governments from tying

their own hands too tightly. The structural response is to permit escape
from an ill-advised LAPP through the sunset provision described
above. 232 But with a twenty-year sunset provision, for example, a particu-

lar local government may find itself with a two-decade penalty in the
fierce race between local governments. That is, admittedly, one of the
potential costs of the proposal. Of course, if increased property protec228. Such shortsightedness is a common thread in behavioral economics. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
1551, 1568 (1998) (describing potential criminals discounting prison sentences); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1194 (1997) (describing
people's myopia about future events).
229. For a discussion of public choice theory, see sources cited supra note 96.
230. The kinds of tradeoffs are discussed in more detail in Part IV where the Article
identifies those property protections that are particularly expensive for different kinds of
governments.
231. Public choice theorists have demonstrated that special interest group power is
greatest when it comes to deciding technical or complex questions. Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63, 88 (1990) ("The
influence of special interests is strongest when the statutory provision at issue is narrow or
merely technical, the legislator feels that her constituency will not care one way or the
other, and the provision does not ultimately conflict with the legislator's own ideology.").
232. See supra Part II.C.2.
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tion is really as valuable as members of the property rights movement
think, then property values will not suffer but will actually benefit from
increasing protection because of the resulting increase in demand.
D. Regulatory Forum Shopping
Another objection to the LOPP proposal is that it does not go far
enough. By their nature, LAPPs bind only local governments to a property regime. A LAPP provides no guarantee that the state or even the

federal government will not step in and do precisely what the local government has promised not to do. This is, in fact, true. As now, property
owners will continue to face some risk of state or federal regulation.

This, in turn, opens the door to regulatory forum shopping. In the
most likely example, imagine a developer seeking to assemble land for a
new development and wanting to enlist the government's condemnation
power on its behalf. If a local government has precommitted not to condemn property for economic redevelopment or to prevent blight-the
two most common justifications for condemn-and-retransfer plans-the
developer is not necessarily out of luck. Instead, the developer can petition the state to condemn property on its behalf. It is not hard to find
real world examples of this dynamic. Presently, New York State is threatening condemnations around the Atlantic Rail Yards in Brooklyn on behalf of a private developer, Forest City Ratner, to create a new and revitalized downtown Brooklyn. Instead of enlisting the city to assemble land
for the project, the Empire State Development Corporation, a state

agency, is threatening to condemn the property.2 33 This opportunity to
bypass local decisionmakers allowed Forest City Ratner to select the forum likely to be friendliest to the proposal. Indeed, conventional wisdom
holds that developers more often succeed in the state political process
23 4
than in the local political process.
There is no quick and easy fix for this problem. The LOPP proposal
cannot apply to state and federal regulations. The benefits of interlocal
competition rely on real elasticity in the property market and actual
choice by property owners about where to live and invest. This kind of
elasticity exists at the local level, especially as between the suburbs and

233. See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, Arena Project for Brooklyn Wins Approval from
M.T.A., N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2005, at Bi (describing plans).
234. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. Rev. 1243, 1274 n.137 (1997) (citing sources arguing that developers are more
successful in state politics).
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towns around a central city. 235 The same is simply not true at the state
level where there is far less elasticity.23 6
This does not undermine the benefits of the LOPP proposal, however. Local government actions are a frequent source of takings litiga-

tion, and providing a clearer definition of local power will eliminate-or
at least clarify-a substantial source of risk for property owners. Large
projects like the development of the Brooklyn Rail Yards are indeed high
profile but are nevertheless quite rare compared to run-of-the-mill local

development. Smaller local developers-those others besides the Forest
City Ratners of the country-may have a much harder time enlisting the

state to aid their developments. Although some risk of action by higher
levels of government remains, reducing the risk surrounding local regulations is a substantial benefit.

IV. LOPPs, LAPPs,

PROPERTY PROTECTION, AND THE TAKINGS

CLAUSE

Implicit in the LOPP proposal is a new way of thinking about restric-

tions on government power to regulate private property, restrictions that
primarily are found in the Takings Clause. The question the LOPP pro-

posal presents is what level of property protection is most appropriate for
a particular local government to attract foreign investment. The idea, at

its heart, is that property protection can be construed as a tool for encouraging investment. Perhaps this is how the Takings Clause itself
should be interpreted, as offering those protections that are important to
investment, and the content might change significantly depending on the

governmental actor.
This suggestion might seem like a strange, if not dangerous, way of
thinking about property rights against the government. The Takings
Clause is usually thought to limit the relationship between a government

and property owners within its borders. Competing political theories provide different content to this relationship. James Madison viewed the

Takings Clause as a central bulwark protecting property owners from the
increasing political power of the propertyless.2 37 Similarly, political process theorists view the Clause like other provisions in the Bill of Rights as
protecting small minorities against majoritarian abuse. 238 Current eco235. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in
Perspective on Public Choice 73, 84 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) ("A few large
governments (counties) are not sufficiently competitive to ensure efficiency."); see also
Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 519 (noting that people working in New York City can choose
among hundreds of local governments under which to live).
236. Interstate competition certainly exists, but usually for investments that are
relatively transportable, like corporate charters and self-insurance.
237. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 850 (1995) (quoting James
Madison, Note to his Speech on the Rights of Suffrage, in The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 450, 452 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)). For alternate theories, see id.
at 817 n.186 (identifying sources that discuss possible influence of Locke).
238. See id. at 882-83 (articulating process theory).
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nomic theories view the government's power to take property as a tool
that should be limited to preventing holdouts and market failures, and

should be constrained by remedies designed to promote efficient regulatory incentives. 23 9 Each of these theories specifies a different inquiry into
the appropriate limits of the Takings Clause in any particular case: Is the

government discriminating against landed property owners? Is a government action motivated by majoritarian or minoritarian political pressures? Is the exercise of government power necessary to overcome specific market failures?
In addition to these theories with their focus on the relationship be-

tween individual property owners and the government, property protection can also serve the purely instrumental goal of attracting foreign investment. This presents a very different question, namely, what kind of

property protection should a local government offer to best encourage
investment? The more protective the property regime, the less risk there
is for developers and other investors. However, any increase in property
protection increases the real costs to the government of all sorts of government actions, from condemnation to regulation. If the government
could take property for free, building roads, parks, or even the occasional
factory would be much less expensive. A government that reserved for
itself the power to take property for free, however, would suffer real economic consequences from a disadvantage in attracting any investment at
all. Presumably, then, a government should offer property protection
only when such protection will cost less than the benefits it will generate
in increased investment.
Revealingly, this utilitarian formula offers some new insights into
perennial takings problems. What, for example, is the significance of

protecting only "distinct investment-backed expectations," to quote the
cryptic phrase from Penn CentraP24 0 Perhaps this should be the natural
limit of property protection because it is all that is necessary to encourage
the investment in the first place. 24 1
Looking at property this way is not as radical as it might initially
seem. In international law, it is commonplace to think of treaties and
other international commitments to respect property rights as tools that
developing countries use to induce foreign investment. Bilateral investment treaties often include commitments by developing countries to pro239. See Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 59, at 54-56 (defending eminent
domain when necessary to offset market failures, such as risk of monopoly, and justifying
compensation requirement as incentive for efficient regulation); Levinson, supra note 96,
at 348-50 (describing traditional economic account of Takings Clause).
240. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 127 (1978).
241. Protecting windfalls is unnecessary to attract an efficient level of investment. Cf.
Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and
Application, 13 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 29 (2005) ("The most bizarre disconnect between
economic rationality and copyright is the retroactive extension of copyright terms. Works
that are in existence can hardly be subject to further incentives. Any additional gains are
windfalls and any costs to the public unnecessary.").
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tect the investments of wealthier developed countries. 242 NAFTA also includes its own version of the Takings Clause-arguably providing
stronger protection than the Takings Clause-and it is generally viewed

as protecting investments by Canada and the United States in Mexico.

243

More generally, too, the effect of property protection on owner investment incentives is a central justification for the Takings Clause. 244 Many
scholars have observed that without a compensation requirement, people
would underinvest in property. 2 45
This same idea can be applied directly to local governments, where
foreign investors are broadly defined to include anyone who might invest
in property. This includes homeowners, developers, and companies deciding where to do business. 246 Local governments now compete for

&

242. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 157, 170-71 (2005) ("[T]he motivation for the
developing country to conclude the [bilateral investment] agreements in most cases was to
attract foreign investment. The theory was that offering legal protections to foreign
investment would induce foreign investors to invest." (citation omitted)); cf. Michael
Heller & Christopher Serkin, Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1385, 1404 (1999) (arguing that restitution rules in former communist
countries were designed to attract foreign investment). Of course, the unequal bargaining
positions between developed and developing countries can force the latter into significant
concessions that limit or even eliminate the value of increased foreign investment. Cf.
Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework
on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 Nw. J. Int'l L.
Bus. 95, 99 (2005) (arguing that in African countries, "the desire for [foreign direct
investment] overwhelmingly precludes the possibility of effectively using the results of a
thorough analysis of economic, political, and social or other gains that may come from
such inflows, and therefore what laws and policies need to be erected to realize such
gains"). This outcome is less likely in interlocal competition because the Takings Clause
provides a constitutional floor of rights offered, and the states themselves can, in their
LOPP legislation, limit the terms of the competition by defining the options available in a
LAPP.
243. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 16, at 37-42 (describing NAFTA's Investor's Bill
of Rights generally, and asserting that while "many have argued that NAFTA simply
'exports' the U.S. regulatory takings standard into international law ... in fact, the NAFTA
tribunal decisions and dicta significantly exceed U.S. takings protections" (footnote
omitted)); Jacqueline Granados, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment Under
NAFTA Chapter 11: Prospects for the Western Hemisphere Under Chapter 17 of the
FTAA, 13 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 189, 223 (2005) (concluding that NAFTA has helped
shift Mexico's investment policy toward greater protections for foreign investors).
244. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 491,
542 (2006) ("[The just compensation requirement] enables private investment in property
as such investment would be unlikely if the government could freely take private property
without 'just compensation.'").
245. See Dagan, supra note 129, at 748-49 (arguing compensation requirement
promotes efficient investment in property).
246. Broadly construed, it includes both prospective and existing property owners.
Existing owners can be viewed as "foreign" investors in that they are forgoing the decision
to move their investment somewhere else. They are "foreign" in the sense that their
investment is still something that a local government must seek to attract.
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these foreign investments in many arenas. 24 7 Adding property protection
to the mix is a natural extension of this interlocal competition.

It is obviously no easy task to decide what level of property protection
will maximize investment. The answer will vary considerably depending
on the nature and character of the local government. Indeed, variation

among local governments is central to the Tiebout Hypothesis and therefore to this Article's legislative proposal. But the takings inquiry is already
a fact intensive and largely ad hoc affair. A focus on creating the prop-

erty regime that will best attract local investment simply changes the nature of the inquiry. The following sections therefore offer some starting
assumptions and generalities about the competing interests of different

kinds of local governments, suggesting which particular forms of property
protection are likely to be the most and the least costly, and which are
likely to generate the greatest investment gains. This is useful both thcoretically and also as a roadmap for local governments given the opportunity to adopt LAPP-style property protection.
A. Local Government Preferences
There are many ways to differentiate local governments from each
other. Size, wealth, economic base, geographic region, climate, diversity,
and other factors, all might affect a local government's preferences when
it comes to local property protection. Indeed, this diversity is what makes
the LOPP proposal so appealing. The distinctions with the most likely
systemic impact on LAPP preferences, however, track the size and density
of the government, its proximity to a central city, and the complexity of
the bureaucratic infrastructure.
First, and perhaps most obviously, the present level of development
in a locality will affect how important the power of eminent domain is,
especially for large development projects. For a town or suburb with a
significant amount of undeveloped land, chances are that property for a
2 48
development can be assembled without the power of eminent domain.

Given an adequate supply of land suitable for development, the market
for the land is likely to be competitive and, in fact, preferable to the expense of formal condemnation. 249 As the supply of undeveloped land

decreases, however, the power to condemn becomes more important and
247. See James Surowiecki, It Pays to Stay, New Yorker, Dec. 13, 2004, at 40, 40
(describing how cities "dangle a lure" to investors).
248. See Fennell, supra note 119, at 972 ("If markets are sufficiently thick, the wouldbe holdout's tactics will be unavailing; the purchaser can simply buy a different parcel of
land elsewhere."). The exception comes when a development or other public project
requires a particular building site. Cf. Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J. 1489, 1558
(1999) ("When the government is trying to buy a specific piece of property, however, it is
in a bilateral monopoly with one landowner.").
249. See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How
Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929,
934 ("Eminent domain is an expensive way to acquire property." (citing, inter alia, Merrill,
Public Use, supra note 47)).
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more valuable. That is to say, alternatives to eminent domain are more

costly to developed cities than to communities with more available property, especially when it comes to projects that require assembling property owned by multiple owners. 25 0

For similar reasons, amortization is a particularly important tool for
cities to create comprehensive zoning and land use regulations. Almost
every existing use is a potential nonconforming use in the event of a zoning change. The extent of existing development in developed cities

means that changes in applicable zoning must either include an enormous number of nonconforming uses-potentially undermining the effi-

cacy of the zoning regime-or come with some plan for eliminating the
nonconforming uses over time. A city can always buy out nonconforming
uses, either through voluntary sales or condemnation, but this is an expensive proposition. Cheapest, by far, is to amortize existing nonconforming uses in lieu of compensation, thus regulating them out of existence. 25 1 Limiting the power to amortize uses in this way is more
expensive for a city than for a town or suburb simply because of the quantity of potentially nonconforming uses in a more developed area.

The more complex the bureaucracy in a local government, the
higher the costs of temporary takings. A local administrative officer in a
small town may have the unilateral power to grant a zoning permit, requiring only that the permit be posted in one public place. 252 Requesting a variance from the zoning ordinance can often be done without a
lawyer in a brief meeting with people who may also happen to be neighbors, if not friends. 253 Contrast this with a city like New York. Trying to
build in New York involves jumping through numerous administrative
hoops, each of which is fraught with peril for even the most sophisticated
builder or developer. Multiple layers of review for projects of any size can
pit different local authorities against each other as they try to navigate the

competing constituencies and interest groups they represent. Large city
land use decisions are complex and slow, even under the best of conditions. For a relatively nimble small government, the threat of compensa-

tion during the pendency of the regulatory approval process is not partic250. This is not limited just to cities. Old, inner-ring suburbs often have little
available land, even though they may be much less dense than a city. See Robert
Bruegmann, Sprawl 61-64 (2005) (describing increasing population density in certain
suburban areas). Nevertheless, assembling land will still often require dealing with
holdouts that might prevent a project from going forward at all.
251. For a discussion of amortization, see supra Part II.B.8.
252. E.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 4449 (2004) (requiring "administrative officer"
responsible for issuing zoning permits to "[p]ost a copy of the permit in at least one public
place in the municipality"); Zoning Regulations, Town of Marlboro, Vt. § 202 (2003) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (setting out requirements that must be met before
"Administrative Officer" can issue zoning permit).
253. See, e.g., Zoning Regulations, Town of Marlboro, Vt. § 204(2) (requiring that
variances may only be granted in compliance with Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 4468, which
requires notice of a public hearing before municipal panel and which allows for lawyers
but does not require their presence).
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ularly daunting. The amount of time needed for approval is sufficiently
short that damages, if any, will be minor, if not de minimis. For cities, on

the other hand, having to compensate developers for delays arising out of
regulatory approvals could prove crippling to land use controls.
Some LAPP protections are likely to prove less important for larger
local governments. For example, exactions are a less important tool for

cities because of their diverse economic base. Cities have many ways of
raising money and so are not as dependent on new developments entirely
paying their own way. More generally, too, the effect of compensation on

a city's land use decisions and regulatory incentives will be substantially
less than in smaller governments. The per capita costs of a government
action are more important politically than the absolute value. 254 The
costs of a $500,000 project spread over one million people will come with
far lower political costs than a $100,000 project spread over one thousand

people. A large population, combined with a relatively diverse tax base,
will make a city government less price sensitive than a smaller
government.
Suburban governments face their own unique set of issues. The
smaller and more residential a suburb is, the more it will be motivated by
homeowner interests.2 55 Suburbs therefore will want to retain a robust
zoning power in order to control housing supply and median house
prices. Because of their dependence on property taxation, suburbs want
25 6
Every family that moves
to minimize free riders on public services.
school age children into the suburb but pays less than the median share
of property taxes will, in effect, increase the cost of the schools to everyone else. 25 7 In terms of LAPP provisions, this means increasing the
threshold for liability, as well as giving neighbors the ability to block new
development by requiring greater consistency with the general plan.
Suburbs' other relevant characteristic is the extent to which they are
at the mercy of regional development pressures. A thriving central city
will create spillover development pressures on neighboring suburbs as demand for housing in the city outstrips supply and people are forced to

the geographical margins. 25 8 Retaining a broad power to impose exactions is particularly important for suburbs in this situation. A precommitment to limit or prohibit the use of exactions will make it impossible for a
suburb to extract the full marginal cost that new development im254. See Komesar, supra note 95, at 61 ("Interest groups with small numbers but high
per capita stakes have sizeable advantages in political action ... ."); Serkin, Big Differences,
supra note 2, at 1651 ("Even where the absolute value of the government action is high, it
may still be difficult to mobilize a majority of voters or taxpayers unless their per capita
stakes are also high.").
255. This claim has been explored most exhaustively by Fischel, Homevoter
Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 16.
256. See id. at 68-69.
257. See id. (citing Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional
Differences in Local Tax Prices, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 743 (1976)).
258. New York is a perfect example of this phenomenon.
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poses.2 5 9 Therefore, each new development threatens to become a net
loser for the suburb, increasing taxes and potentially leading to a downward spiral of increased taxes and decreased services. The more development that comes in, the more the suburb loses.
Needless to say, there is no one right answer for any given community. Indeed, the point of the LOPP proposal is to recognize the variation

in local governments' interests. Nevertheless, this discussion provides a
starting point for navigating some of the competing costs of local property protection.
B. Investor Preferences
The costs of different kinds of property protection vary with the na-

ture of the local government. The benefits, on the other hand, vary with
the preferences of the investors it is trying to attract. Just as it is possible
to generalize-at least as a starting point-about the interests of different
kinds of governments, it is also possible to generalize about the interests
of different kinds of investors in local property. The number of different
kinds of local investors is enormously varied. A fine-grained snapshot
would distinguish between homeowners with school age children and
those without, businesses with low-wage employees who need affordable
places to live and those without, stores dependent on local consumers
and those that cater to nonlocals. The list is nearly endless.
Despite this diversity of actual interests, general classes of potential

investors whose preferences cohere enough to discuss in the abstract include homeowners, developers, and businesses. Although individual
members of each of these groups will undoubtedly have their own unique
preferences, it is again possible to construct some common interests as a
starting point in generating local property protection.
As a group, developers are likely to want the highest level of property
protection. Most developers want as much assurance as possible that

their projects will not face significant regulatory hurdles. They therefore
favor expedited permit processes and liability if the government sits on a
permit application for too long. In addition, they prefer a relatively low
threshold before a diminution of value is compensable. The absence of

any assurance of property protection among these variables poses a significant risk to developers and, at least on the margin, may prevent some
developments from being built. For a local government that wants to

attract development, then, these are particularly important assurances to
be able to provide.
Other forms of property protection are surprisingly less important to
many developers. Consider compensation. Of course, developers generally prefer more compensation than less. But how much is necessary to
259. See Been, Exit, supra note 13, at 482 (claiming that principal impetus for
municipalities to impose exactions upon developers is to accommodate infrastructurebased costs to communities in which development occurs).
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induce developers to invest? The fair market value of the property may
be all that is required. One of the most trenchant criticisms of compensation based on fair market value is that it excludes the property owner's
subjective value in his or her property. 26 0 For a developer, however, investments in land reflect rational business decisions. Compensable sub-

jective damages should therefore be all but nonexistent. Moreover, the
property's fair market value is determined in reference to its highest and
best use. 26 1 For developers, most takings challenges arise out of government actions that prevent the development of the property in the first
place. The undeveloped property's value will therefore be its value as if it
had been developed, minus the anticipated costs of development. 26 2 Depending on how the standard is actually applied, a developer may be in-

different as between developing the property and receiving its fair market
value as compensation from the government.26 3 The fair market value

standard, then, is not going to make an otherwise appealing development
proposal suddenly unappealing for the developer.
The impact of exactions, too, will be quite context dependent. If
developers can pass along the cost of the exaction to the ultimate purchaser, they may be relatively indifferent as to the presence and size of
exactions. 26 4 If those are costs that will eat directly into their profits, on
the other hand, they will oppose exactions-or favor communities that

impose smaller exactions or none at all. The ability of developers to pass
on the costs of exactions depends almost entirely on the elasticity in the
development market. 265
Finally, developers are likely to support a broad power of eminent
domain, especially for economic development, because they stand to be
partial beneficiaries of any such government program, either directly or
indirectly through improved economic conditions. 26 6 The ability to as-

260. See Serkin, Valuing Interest, supra note 202, at 425-26 (examining
compensation rules); see also Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation
of Future Interests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 BYU L.
Rev. 789, 793-94 (listing excluded categories of damages from fair market value, including
"good will, lost profits, and sentimental attachment").
261. See Serkin, Meaning of Value, supra note 9, at 689 ("It is black letter law that fair
market value is based on the value of property as put to its most profitable use, usually
referred to as its highest and best use.").
262. See id. at 690.
263. One of the biggest question marks here is where the risk of actually developing
the property is allocated. See id. at 689-92.
264. See Ellickson, supra note 80, at 399-400.
265. See id.
266. See Am. Planning Ass'n, Policy Guide on Public Redevelopment 10 (2004),
available at http://www.planning.org/policyguides/pdf/Redevelopment.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) ("[American Planning Association] and its Chapters encourage
state legislation preserving the ability of cities to use redevelopment tools and techniques,
including eminent domain, when appropriate to achieve a well-defined public purpose
adopted through an inclusive public process.").
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semble land may be an important tool for local governments to attract
development, especially in areas that are already developed.
Businesses-whether malls, factories, stores, office space, etc.-wear
two hats. In the first, they may have to build or remodel property for
their specific use. This aligns their interests closely with developers.
They want to be able to build quickly, with a minimum of regulatory burdens, and to open for business as soon as possible. Unlike developers,
however, they will have no ability to pass on the cost of any exactions to
some subsequent purchaser of the property and so will generally oppose
them.

Wearing their other hat, as ongoing businesses within a community,
they are likely to have still different interests. First, they are much more

likely to care about the extent of compensation in the event their property is taken. Unlike a developer whose property is usually taken before it
is even developed, a business is likely to face considerably higher losses in
the event it has to move. 267 In general, the fair market value standard

does not include moving expenses or the loss of goodwill that businesses
incur. A business will therefore strongly prefer some higher measure of

compensation, and fair market value may seem particularly unjust.
A business is also likely to have a complicated attitude toward the
power of eminent domain, especially for economic redevelopment.

A

preexisting business is unlikely to be the direct beneficiary of a condemnand-retransfer plan, although a large business sometimes will be.268
Moreover, businesses have some reason to fear that their property might
end up in redevelopment's crosshairs. 26 9 But most economic redevelopment initiatives are intended to stimulate the local economy, and this

usually means good news for preexisting local businesses too. 270 In general, then, the attitude of a business toward the government's power of
eminent domain may depend a lot on the nature of the business and the
extent to which it believes it might be at risk of condemnation.

Homeowners' interests are the most diverse. What property interests
will best induce homeowners to move or to stay in a municipality? Some
267. See Smith v. State of La., Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 872 So. 2d 594, 596-600 (La.
Ct. App. 2004) (discussing business owner's claim for moving expenses, expenses of
business reestablishment, loss of leasehold advantage, reimbursement for improvements to
business space, and loss of business attributable to relocation).
268. Poletown is one example, where Detroit controversially condemned a large swath
of property to convey to General Motors. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
269. One of the leading cases on public use, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954),
involved the condemnation of an unblighted sports apparel store for economic
redevelopment. Likewise, in Justice O'Connor's parade of horribles in her Kelo dissent,
she singled out a motel owner whose property could be taken to turn into a Ritz Carlton.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270. This is usually the principal justification of economic redevelopment. See Krier
& Serkin, supra note 55, at 869 (observing that putative public benefit in most condemnand-retransfer cases is diffused economic benefit).
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homeowners might value historic preservation, others aesthetic or demographic homogeneity, others environmental protection, and others
strong property protection. 27 1 The list goes on and on, and these differences are reflected in the heterogeneity of different communities, allowing for the kind of sorting described by the Tiebout Hypothesis.
There is, however, a core interest that all homeowners share, at least to

some extent, in preserving and enhancing the value of their property. 272
This may or may not be the most important interest for particular homeowners, but it is the best place to look for some consistency among home-

owners that cuts across their idiosyncratic preferences. 273
Of course, deciding what kind of local property protection will be
best for property values is no easy task. If homeowners believe that property values will benefit most from attracting more development, then they

might be willing to adopt the property protection most appealing to developers. Nevertheless, homeowners as a group also have their own independent interests. For one, homeowners stand to lose a lot if the government takes their property because of the significant subjective values that
homeowners usually place on their homes. 274 This militates in favor of

high compensation when property is taken. 275
On the other hand, increasing takings liability for local governments
comes with some significant costs for homeowners. In the event that in-

creased liability means paying property owners more often-and potentially more money-this will require raising more money in property
271. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1656-57 (describing subjective
values in property).
272. According to Fischel:
The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the most numerous
and politically influential group within most localities, are guided by their
concern for the value of their homes to make political decisions that are more
efficient than those that would be made at a higher level of government. ... They
balance the benefits of local policies against the costs when the policies affect the
value of their home, and they will tend to choose those policies that preserve or
increase the value of their homes.
Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 4. Developers and businesses are also
interested in the financial impact of a LAPP, but their interests will turn more on income
streams than on the value of the underlying property. This is particularly well reflected in
the valuation standard for businesses, which uses a discounted cash flow as the driver
instead of focusing on the property itself. See Richard B. Peiser & Anne B. Frej,
Professional Real Estate Development 81 (2d ed. 2003).
273. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1657 (arguing that, even accounting
for diverse homeowner interests, "homeowner preferences contain[ ] a large measure of
concern for property's objective market value").
274. Limitations on use create their own harms. Moreover, people are harmed simply
when the government tells them that they cannot do something on their property. These
kinds of extra harms are catalogued in Michelman's famous category of demoralization
costs. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-16 (1967).
275. An alternative, more radical proposal would offer homeowners insurance to
protect against a decrease in property values. See Fischel, NIMBY Syndrome, supra note
227, at 886-89.
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taxes. 276 Higher property taxes mean decreased property values. 2 77 Al-

ternatively, if increased liability results in the local government regulating
less, this might pave the way-literally-for low-income housing and
other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) that will decrease residential
property values. 2 78 If nothing else, a decrease in land use controls is
likely to result in more housing, and an increase in supply is also likely to

decrease existing property values. 279
These various considerations make it more likely that homeowners

want their local governments to retain a relatively broad power to regulate without triggering a compensation requirement. This means a high
threshold under the diminution of value test before compensation is due.
On the other hand, homeowners are likely to favor requiring greater consistency with the comprehensive plan as an important tool in protecting
their own property's value. Homeowners can also prevent many undesir-

able local uses by policing local governments' variances and rezonings.
This combination of limited takings liability and the strong enforcement
of the comprehensive plan creates a strong roadblock to change and preserves the status quo.
Finally, homeowners' interests surrounding the government's power
of eminent domain are shaped by the same competing pressures felt by
local businesses. Eminent domain is a threat to homeowners' property
rights.28 0 Moreover, because the stakes are so high if their property is
taken, they will be particularly loathe to concede broad condemnation
power to the government. 28 1 On the other hand, a community that gives
up the power to condemn in some circumstances will face higher costs

for assembling property and may have a harder time attracting develop276. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 2, at 1652-55.
277. Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 39-42 (discussing
capitalization).
278. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 Yale L.J. 1383, 1388-89 (1994)
(maintaining that ultimate result of locally undesirable land use is "likely to be that the
neighborhood becomes poorer than it was before the siting of the LULU" in part because
less desirable neighborhood may decrease property values). But see Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable
Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001, 1020-23 (1993) (discussing possibility that locally
undesirable land uses do not have detrimental effect on values of neighboring property).
279. See Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of
Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J.L. & Econ. 149, 158-59 (1987) (demonstrating
that house prices are 17% to 38% higher in communities in San Francisco Bay Area with
growth controls than in those communities without growth controls); TimothyJ. Choppin,
Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier: Policies to Promote
Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 Geo. LJ. 2039, 2055 (1994) (observing that
restrictive development policies may raise value of existing homes).
280. See supra Part LA (discussing perceived threat to property rights of broad
condemnation power).
281. See Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, supra note 2, at 8-12 (noting that central
importance of their property values leads homeowners to be more risk averse and to
participate more fully in community affairs).
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ment to the detriment of some communities. Homeowners' preferences
for LAPP limitations on eminent domain are therefore likely to be highly
contextual and depend on the nature of the community and on whether

particular property owners feel at risk of government expropriation.
C. PairingInvestors and Local Governments
If a property regime benefits a local government by attracting invest-

ment but imposes costs in the form of decreased flexibility and increased
compensation associated with regulation, the question a local government should ask is which LAPP precommitments are likely to generate
the greatest benefits at the lowest cost. As always, the answer for any specific local government will depend at least in part on factors outside this

analysis, but it is now possible to suggest, or at least gesture toward, some
general answers. Where a particular property protection is cheap for a
certain government and valuable for the property owner, there are real

opportunities for mutual gain. Conversely, if the property protection is
expensive for the government and not particularly valuable to the inves-

tor, property protection comes at a high cost.
There are only a few points of convergence where the cost to the
government of offering property protection is low and the benefit to potential property owners is high, or vice versa. Most obviously, large,
densely developed cities should not limit their ability to condemn property, even for economic development. A broad power to condemn is a
particularly valuable power for such cities and is potentially important for
attracting business and development. Not everyone favors broad powers
to condemn, however, and the cost of potential condemnations will come
primarily from chilling homeowner investment in the city. To offset this
concern, cities should also offer increased compensation when property
is taken. This confers a substantial benefit to property owners at relatively
small cost to cities who are able to spread the costs of compensation
28 2
across a broad tax base.
Less developed local governments, on the other hand, may be more
willing to concede the power of eminent domain in order to attract
homeowners. Their other precommitments should depend on whether
they want to attract new development or limit growth. If the former, they
should precommit to paying compensation for many regulatory delays.
Because of their relatively streamlined permitting process, smaller suburbs in particular will be able to limit or eliminate unwanted liability for
regulatory delays. But, if a suburb or other small local government wants
to limit growth, it should pay compensation only for a substantial diminution of value, and require consistency with the general plan. The result:

less liability, and neighbors with a greater ability to police variances and
rezonings.
282. See supra text accompanying note 254.
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This synthesis of property owner and government interests is hardly
comprehensive. But even this quick treatment adds important specificity
to the central insight that the costs of different kinds of property protection will vary considerably with the size and character of the local govern-

ment and will provide heterogeneous benefits to different classes of property owners. A well-functioning property regime should take these
differences into account.
CONCLUSION

Interlocal competition for property protection could provide an im-

portant and cost-effective means for local governments to attract foreign
investment, whether in the form of developers, businesses, or homeowners. This competition does not happen now because local governments
have no good way of precommitting to a particular level and kind of
property protection. If such a mechanism for precommitment existed,
investors could choose the property regime most consistent with their

preferences. This would encourage Tiebout-style sorting between jurisdictions and unlock property values that now must reflect some uncer-

tainty about the regulatory treatment property will receive.
This Article has proposed the mechanism for providing locally appli-

cable property protection, including both the specific and general characteristics that such protection must have. Importantly, too, thinking

about property protection as a form of creating investment incentives
helps to clarify the intersection between private property rights and the
government's right to regulate. That point of intersection may change
depending on the characteristics of the government, the nature of the
property owner, and the particular interest he or she is claiming. This, in

turn, suggests a new inquiry for deciding the content of property protection in general, and the Takings Clause in particular. The question is
when, and under what specific conditions, will extending property protection generate more benefit from increased investment incentives than
it will cost in decreased regulatory authority. This is a new question about
an old problem, and even if it is quite hard to answer in a particular

situation, it offers a new way of analyzing the important competing interests

that property

represent.

protection

and

the

Takings

Clause

necessarily

